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A. Presentation of the Thesis
This article deals with the development of law; i.e., the evolution
of a legal regime in a field which prior thereto was not subject to law.
It is my view that such a process took place in recent decades in the
area of trade relations between sovereign nations. The period since
World War II, and particularly recent years, is marked by the clear
development of a conventional legal regime which regulates trade re-
lations among the majority of countries of the world, as expressed by
the multiplication of legal norms and the strengthening of the binding
nature of these norms and the procedures for enforcing them. An in-
depth examination of this phenomenon and an analysis of its political
and economic causes may shed light on not only an important phe-
nomenon in the field of international law, but also on the role of law
generally in human society.
An international trade agreement will always be in the nature of
a compromise by each of the State Parties between each State's aspi-
ration to attain the economic benefits introduced by the agreement,
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University, Israel. S.J.D., University of Toronto, Can-
ada (1994). This article is an English version of an article that is to be published in the Tel Aviv
University Law Review. It is based on a paper first presented at a conference on "Law and
History," organized by the Historical Society of Israel, that took place in July 1995 at Haifa
University. An extended version was presented at the ASIL IELG conference in Bethesda in
May 1996. The author is indebted to the participants of these conferences, as well as to Profes-
sor Joseph Weiler, Uriel Reichman, Samuel Sandier, and Joshua Krasna for their valuable
comments.
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and each State's desire to preserve optimum sovereignty. On the one
hand, every international agreement naturally contains limitations on
the freedom of action of each State and constrains the policy options
open to it. On the other hand, the economic benefits which each State
wishes to attain through the trade agreement, will not be achieved in
their entirety unless there is reciprocal honouring of the obligations
contained in the agreement. The first consideration, the preservation
of sovereignty and prevention of restrictions on courses of action, cre-
ates a tendency towards preferring non-binding agreements and
agreements which leave the optimum freedom of action to the State,
for example, by flexible or vague drafting, and use of "escape clauses"
and weak enforcement procedures. Such agreements allow flexibility
in honoring obligations and retain scope for diplomatic manoeuvring.
This will allow the States to consider internal political interests which
may arise in the future and which may require measures to be taken
that are contrary to their commitments under the agreement. Such
scope of action is, of course, open to exploitation by all parties. The
more it is exploited, the greater is the uncertainty in international
commerce. The greater the uncertainty, the more severe is the injury
to the other parties to the Agreement. The greater the severity of
injury, the higher are the chances that the economic goals of the
agreement will be frustrated.
In this constant conflict between opposing interests, in the past,
the political scales tipped in favor of sovereignty and flexibility. The
trade agreements, to the extent they existed, were limited in their con-
tents and were less binding in their nature. Many governments saw
these agreements not as a binding legal regime but as a DIPLOMATIC-
PoLrricA. framework which could provide a "basis for negotiation
between States for the purpose of attaining a balance between bene-
fits and obligations."' In recent years, however, there is a growing
demand by States to regulate their trade relations by using norms and
enforcement procedures that are LEGAL in character, create signifi-
cant limitations on the sovereignty of the States, and, in extreme
cases, even exclude the States' power to determine policy in certain
socio-economic fields. The most prominent examples of this latter
1 These statements were made in the past in relation to the GATT agreement. Cf. OLumR
LONG, LAW AND ris LIMITATIONS IN Tim GATr MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 21 (1985). In
the 1970s, Long was the Secretary General of GATr. He states: "These limitations reflect the
difficulties inherent in any attempt to regulate within a legal framework something as dynamic
and fluctuating as world trade, despite provisions for waivers, exceptions and a safeguard
clause." See generally KENNETH W. DAM, Tam GAT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 335-36 (1970); and in greater detail, see infra Part II, para.C:1.
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phenomenon are provided by the treaties establishing the European
Community (EC).2 In other international frameworks, a similar trend
is also apparent, even if it does not possess the extreme characteristics
of the EC. This process is hereinafter termed the "juridicization pro-
cess ' 3 of international trade relations, a term which is meant to en-
compass developments both on the substantive and procedural level.
The writings in this field have hitherto concentrated on the insti-
tutional developments, particularly in connection with the new dis-
pute settlement procedures of the World Trade Organization (WTO).4
In this context, commentators have spoken of "judicialization" of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a term that refers
to the "judiciary," i.e., the mechanism entrusted with resolving dis-
putes and ruling on questions of interpretation. This thesis, in con-
trast, argues for a more integrated perspective on the developments in
the international trade arena-a perspective that views law as a gen-
eral phenomenon composed of both substantive and institutional
components and one that is not confined to the multilateral level
alone. In our view, the procedural and institutional developments in
the WTO form a specific part of a more general trend of world-wide
proportions, which is reflected in significant developments both of the
substantive law of international trade relations and of its institutional
setting in the multilateral GATT agreements and in regional and bilat-
eral trade arrangements. What we have here is a process of legal
evolution, where a new international legal regime regulating the trade
policies of governments is gradually evolving.
2 See, for example, the statements of the European Court in the famous case Costa v.
ENEL, E.C.R. 585.593 (1964): "By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sover-
eignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have lim-
ited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which
binds both their nationals and themselves."
3 "Juridicization" deriving from the word "Juridicus', which means of, or pertaining to,
courts or a legal system, and which also hints at the term "Jure Gentium", "the law of nations".
The term "legalization", which some modem commentators use is less appropriate, as it pertains
to the process of making something lawful; in other words, making lawful a phenomenon which
prior thereto was against the law, a meaning which of course is not applicable to this discussion.
Another important distinction, which will be used later, is betwenn "rule oriented" and "power
oriented" relationships. See JOHN H. JACKSON, Tim WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POL-
ICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 85 (1991).
4 See, eg., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Or-
ganization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 COMMON
Mic. L REv. 1157 (1994); RoBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUToN OF THM MODERN GATT LEGAL SYsTEm (1991).
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In order to prove this claim, Part II of this article examines the
evolution of the multilateral regime governing international trade re-
lations known as GATT, over the last fifty years until the establish-
ment of the WTO. Its transformation from a primarily diplomatic
framework for coordination of trade policies to a legal regime impos-
ing welfare-enhancing limitations on government intervention in the
economy is described and analyzed. To illustrate the juridicization
process in bilateral trade arrangements, Part III then examines devel-
opments in the international trade agreements of Israel, the author's
home country. The various stages of development in these agree-
ments-concluded with most of the major trading powers-also
demonstrate very clearly an identical trend of juridicization as found
on the multilateral level. In Part IV, I then attempt to offer explana-
tions to the phenomenon by analyzing its economic and political roots,
using'some of the theories and models developed within the discipline
of international relations.- Finally, I shall attempt to tie the process
of juridicization to the phenomenon of law as a whole and to what is
known about the stages and causes of the development of law in
human society.
B. Methodology: Defining the Criteria for Examining the
Phenomenon
Prior to turning to a review of developments in this field, it is
necessary to attempt to define the standards according to which the
phenomenon will be examined. More specifically, according to which
criteria will a particular arrangement be regarded as more "legal"
than another?
Legal scholars generally, and researchers in international law in
particular, have conducted extensive discussions about the proper def-
inition of the term "law,"6 and it has even been suggested (even if
somewhat exaggerated) that the number of definitions of law is as
many as the number of lawyers.7 For purposes of this article, I shall
use the definition proposed by Professor Yoram Dinstein, a prominent
Israeli scholar of International Law. Professor Dinstein defines law as
"a binding normative arrangement which a society establishes in order
5 See infra Part D. On the use of this discipline to understand international law, see gener-
ally Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
6 See, e.g., Glanville L. Williams, International Law and the Controversy Concerning the
Word "Law", 22 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1945).
7 YORAM DINsTEiN, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND ThE STATE 14 (1971).
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to limit human behaviour."8 The characteristics which therefore iden-
tify the "legal" nature of any system, as already emphasized by Aqui-
nas,9 are their "binding" character and their power to "limit" the
behavior of persons acting within their framework.10 Accordingly, in-
ternational arrangement "A" is deemed to be more "legal" than inter-
national arrangement "B," if and to the extent that arrangement "A"
creates more severe limitations on th& behavior of States than does
arrangement "B." This effect may occur because of the profusion of
norms in arrangement "A," the stricter formulation of the provisions
in arrangement "A," or the efficacy of the enforcement procedures in
8 Id. In accordance with this approach, Prof. Dinstein thereafter defines international law
as "a binding normative arrangement which international society establishes in order to limit
human behaviour." Id. at 26. Similar definitions have been offered by other prominent scholars
of international law. Brierly's classical definition of international law refers to "the body of rules
and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one an-
other." J. BRIERLY, THE LAWv OF NATIONS 1 (H. Waldock 6th ed., 1963). The term "binding"
implies both the mandatory character of international legal norms, as well as their restrictive
impact on the states who are subject to them. See also J.G. Starke's definition of a legal norm,
infra note 10.
A contending definition would be that of John Austin, who defined law as the "command of
the sovereign," and who regarded the existence of sanctions in case of disobedience as a crucial
element of any legal system. See JOHN AuSITN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETER-
MINED 12 (London: Weidenfeld & Nocolson, 1968). This approach, which is strongly influenced
by Austin's perception of municipal legal systems-in particular the English one-has been
widely criticized and cannot be employed in the field of public international law. See G. Wil-
liams, International Law and the Controversy concerning the Word "Law," 22 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
LAW 146, 147-48 (1945). Indeed, Austin did not regard international law as "law, properly so
called," but as "positive morality." Id. If experience has shown us that "almost all nations ob-
serve almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time"--as Louis Henkin has put it-that, in my mind, proves the inaccuracy of Austin's defini-
tion of "law," rather than the non-existence of international law. See LouIs HENKIN, How NA-
TIONs BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979).
9 Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) in Summa Theologica, defines the nature of law as follows:
"Law is a rule or a measure of action in virtue of which one is led to perform certain actions
and restrained from the performance of others. The term "law" derives [etymologically]
from "binding", because by it one is bound to a certain course of action." THOMAs AQUI-
NAS, SUMMA THnOLooicA Qu. 90 (J.G. Dawson trans.), quoted in LORD LLOYD OF HAMP-
STAD & M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 151 (5th ed.
1985).
10 The definition of the term "law" in the Oxford Dictionary, emphasizes these
characteristics:
"a rule enacted or customary in a community and recognized as enjoining or prohibiting
certain actions and enforced by the imposition of penalties." CONCISE OXFORD DIctION-
ARY 670 (1990).
This definition also explains that the enforcement of legal rules is exercised by means of
sanctions and not by force, a stipulation which conforms with norms of public international
trade law.
The definition of a legal norm is also given by the renowned scholar of international
law, J.G. Starke: "A norm... is a prescription enjoining a defined mode of action." J.G.
Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRrr. Y.B. IN'L L. 66
(1936).
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arrangement "A." In all three cases, the result is that courses of ac-
tion which were previously available to the State are now constricted,
and certain actions may no longer be performed legitimately within
the framework of the arrangement."
C. The Politics and Economics of International Trade Agreements
Although every international trade agreement has its own spe-
cific background anchored in the prevailing specific political and eco-
nomic interests of the States involved, there are some general
characteristics common to all trade agreements which may explain
the need for these agreements and their similar content.
The primary purpose of the trade agreements considered below is
the dismantling of barriers to international trade. These barriers are
found in different forms; tariffs and import charges, bureaucratic ob-
stacles to imports, and subsidies are only a partial list of the various
possibilities. Common to all of these forms of barriers is that they
originate in government policy, the purpose or result of which is the
protection of local industry against competition by foreign manufac-
turers.' 2 Some of the agreements also deal with trade barriers which
do not originate in government interventionism but, rather, in anti-
competition activities of private corporations. 1
3
11 The following is an illustration: if John Doe promises to give Richard Roe £100 "when I
want to", no legal obligation is created, as his "promise" does not restrain him in any way what-
soever. Everything depends on his will, and so long he does not "want" to give the money-he is
under no obligation to do so. Similarly, a State's undertaking not to place protective tariffs on
certain products-where this undertaking is subject to the right of the State to claim the exist-
ence of various "special circumstances," or the existence of a situation where it has almost un-
qualified discretion to accept the complaint of a local manufacturer about imports being
dumped, and to impose a levy on the said imports-is much less "legal" than where such reser-
vations do not exist.
12 It is customary to divide trade barriers into two categories: custom tariffs (i.e., customs
duties and charges equivalent to customs duties), and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The latter cate-
gory includes an almost endless list of methods of distorting the flow of trade, a list which is a
extensive as the inventive powers of government officials around the world. They also include
export incentives which aid local manufacturers to compete with foreign manufacturers in export
markets. A GAIT Secretariat report prepared in the 1970s lists more than 600 non-tariff barri-
ers. See Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Barriers, Nov. 30, 1984, GATr B.I.S.D.
(31st Supp.) at 211 (1985). A list prepared by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development in the 1980s reached a much higher number, see UNCTAD, Non-Tariff Barriers
Affecting the Trade of Developing Countries and Transparency in World Trading Conditions: The
Inventory of Non-Tariff Barriers (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1983).
13 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85-86,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49 (1957); Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association,
Jan. 4, 1960, art. 15, 370 U.N.T.S. 3, 15-16 (1960) [hereinafter EFTA]; Agreement Between the
European Economic Community and the State of Israel, May 11, 1975, 1975 O.J. (L 136) 3.
Generally, these provisions prohibit anti-competition activities, such as co-ordination of prices,
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At the root of the trade agreements lies what is termed the liberal
economic doctrine,' 4 which aims to reduce government intervention in
the flow of trade between States, while recognizing that free trade is
beneficial to the economies of all the acceding States. This doctrine
originates in the theories of renowned economists of the 18t" and 191
centuries, led by David Hume,'5 Adam Smith,'6 David Ricardo, 7 and
John Stuart Mill. 18 According to the "Theory of Relative Advantage,"
proposed by Ricardo,19 a State will always prefer to specialize in in-
dustrial sectors in which it has a relative advantage (in comparison
with other industrial sectors) and permit free trade with foreign coun-
tries in the remaining sectors with the aim of importing those products
which it needs in return for the fruits of its most efficient labor. Such
an economic arrangement will lead to reciprocal benefits for all the
participating States. Every obstacle which prevents this beneficial
trade is detrimental to all the participating States, not only to the State
which wished to export, but also to the State which was to gain from
the import. This theory is, therefore, a refinement of the concept of
specialization, referred to by Plato20 and developed by Smith and Ri-
cardo. Ricardo's theory is still highly regarded by economists" and
provides a powerful intellectual underpinning for the policy of free
establishment of cartels, and exploitation of dominant positions of monopolies, in so far as such
activities impair trade between the countries involved.
14 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HowsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 20 (1995).
15 In 1752, David Hume was the first to repudiate the claims of the mercantile economists of
the 17" and 181 centuries, according to which governments should aim to limit imports and
maximize exports with the purpose of increasing gold reserves. He showed the existence of a
mechanism which always tends to equalize the international balance of payments of States.
Hume's mechanism is described by Paul A. Samuelson. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, THE THEORY OF
ECONOICS 648 (M. Eto trans.) (3d ed. 1963).
16 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
bk. IV, ch. 11 (1890) (1723-1790).
17 DAxIm RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLrnCAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 77 (1911)
(1772-1823).
18 Jom STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLrICAL ECONOMY (1848) (1806-1873).
19 RICARDO, supra note 17.
20 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., Oxford University Press
1941). Plato uses the idea of specialization and the division of labour in order to explain the
origins of human society: "So the conclusion is that more things will be produced and the work
be more easily and better done, when every man is set free from all other occupations to do, at
the right time, the one thing for which he is naturally fit... We shall need more that four citizens,
then to supply all those necessaries we mentioned, For the farmer, naturally, will not make his
own plough.. ." Ld. at bk. 2, 71-73. Thereafter, Plato also draws the inevitable conclusion, Le,
the indispensability of international trade, at least for the purpose of supplying products which
are not manufactured in that State. Id.
21 TREBILCOCK & HowsE, supra note 14, at 2-3.
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trade which is at the basis of international trade agreements. As the
modem economist Paul Samuelson, winner of the Nobel Prize for Ec-
onomics, phrased it: "In fact, the supporters of free trade have one
reason only, but this reason is of pre-eminent weight: free trade pro-
motes a mutually beneficial division of labour among nations, greatly
increases the chance of growth in real national product, and enables a
higher standard of living world-wide.' -".
However, based on this rationale, States ought to adopt a unilat-
eral policy of free trade, as England chose to do in the second half of
the 19 ' century while relying on the theories of Smith and Ricardo
23
and without need for recourse to international agreements. The the-
ory of free trade is unable to explain the necessity for reciprocity
which underlies international trade agreements and characterizes
most of the liberalization achieved in recent decades in international
trade.24 Accordingly, commentators,25 while applying the Public
Choice Theory, generally point to internal political failures which lead
to a flawed decision-making process in which too much weight is given
to the concentrated interests of protected industries, i.e., their owners
and workers, at the expense of the thinly spread interests of consum-
ers who are forced to bear the costs of protection.26 This situation is
created by the superior organizational and lobbying power of the pro-
tected industries in comparison to the large consumer public, whose
individual per capita interests are much smaller than those of the
members of the protected industries. As a result, it is very difficult to
politically break down trade barriers unless compensation is offered to
industry in the form of new foreign markets. These markets can be
opened up to them as a result of international trade agreements that
22 SAMUELSON, supra note 15.
23 See G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY: GATT AND ITS IMPACT ON
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUE ch. I (1965); see also SHEPARD B. CLOUGH
& CHARLES W. COLE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 473 (1941).
24 Most of the liberalization was achieved through the GATT agreement, which is discussed
below, and through regional agreements, such as the European Community, EFTA, and bilateral
free trade areas. Examples of unilateral liberalization are sparse and are exceptions to the rule;
one is the "Program to Expose the Economy to Imports from Third Countries." See Israeli
Finance and Industry Ministers Agree to Dismantle Trade Barriers over Seven Years, 8 Int'l. Trade
Rep. (BNA) 395 (Mar. 13, 1991) [hereiafter Dismantle Trade Barriers].
25 ARTHUR DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking
and Trade Protection, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT SEEKING 217 (Charles K. Rowley et
al. eds., 1988).
26 For an extensive discussion of the politics of trade protection and the various economic
models which have been developed to explain the political process in this connection, see
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., TRADE AND TRANSITIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AD-
TUSTMENT Poucras 171-92 (1990).
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are based on reciprocal, as opposed to unilateral, liberalization.
Moreover, in this connection, every government is affected by the
"prisoners' dilemma" arising out of the desire to dismantle barriers in
export-markets in addition to liberalization at home.27 If it disbands
its barriers unilaterally, it will not have the wherewithal to "pay" its
partners for removing their barriers as well.28
Since the signing of the English-French trade agreement in 1860
(Cobden-Chevalier Treaty), it has been clear to modern statesmen
that international trade agreements may be an extremely useful tool
for liberalization in trade (an idea which was not easily accepted by
the supporters of unilateral free trade policy in England). 29 These
agreements in fact create an international system of regulation whose
purpose is to deal with national systems of regulation; the latter re-
strict trade and protect local industry against foreign competition,
whereas the former aspire to eliminate restrictions, promote trade,
and expose industry to international competition. The international
agreements also aim in this way to reduce uncertainty and instability
existing in international trade, where every State is completely free to
take measures against, and impose restrictions on, exports of other
countries.3" The international trade agreements therefore implement
the vision of the UN Charter to "employ international machinery for
the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peo-
ples."'' a Using the terminology of the New Haven School approach
27 The dilemma is created because every State is likely to prefer preserving its own trade
barriers, while anticipating a unilateral lowering of barriers on the part of the other State on the
basis of that country's own internal interests. 'Thus, the State which "holds out" longest will
ultimately succeed in opening its export markets without needing to open its own markets for
imports. When both countries adopt this policy, ultimately, both loose. In this situation, it be-
comes worthwhile for each country to aim for co-operation in the form of an international agree-
ment for reciprocal liberalization. See Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy, in CO-OPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 226 (Kenneth A. Oye ed.,
1985); see also William R. Cline, "Reciprocity": A New Approach to World Trade Policy?, in
TRADE Pouicy IN rHE 1980s 121, 152 (William R. Cline ed., 1983).
28 This is one of the reasons that the State of Israel, even within the framework of the Unilat-
eral Exposure Program, retained customs at minimal levels and did not cancel them altogether,
i.e., so as to enable "payment" in future negotiations with third countries. See Dismantle Trade
Barriers, supra note 24. See also H.C.J. 1452/93 Igloo v. Minister of Trade and Industry 47(5)
P.D.610, para. 5 of the judgment, where it was held by Israel's High Court of Justice that the
requirement of reciprocity in international trade is a legitimate consideration on the part of the
authorities, which justifies refusing an import permit.
29 For a comprehensive historical overview, see GILBERT R. WnIAM, Trm EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 15-20 (1992).
30 See id. at 12; Cf. ROBERT 0. KEoHANE, AFTER HErmONY 87-88 (1984).
31 U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
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to international law,3 2 international trade agreements act on the level
of attaining "optimal order," and not only "minimal order," in the
international community by maximizing the allocation of economic
resources.
II. THE PROCESS OF JURIDICIZATION OF THE GATT REGIME
. A. Historical Background of the GATT
Today, the GATT forms the most important multilateral frame-
work for the regulation and coordination of the international trade
policies of most of the countries of the world. The conception and
birth of this agreement were inspired by the vision of "a new order"
in the world economy based on cooperation and liberal principles and
was led by the heads of Western States at the end of World War fI.33
The basic rules for this new order were laid down by an international
economic conference, which took place in July 1944 in Bretton
Woods, with the intention of structuring it around three international
organizations-the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank (IBRD) and the International Trade Organization (ITO). The
ITO was intended to operate as a permanent institution which would
both promote the reciprocal removal of barriers and provide a forum
for enforcing obligations in this connection and resolving disputes. 4
From 1946 to 1948 delegations from tens of countries labored
over the preparation of a constitution for this organization. The con-
stitution was finally signed in Havana in 1948 by 53 States.3 5 Concur-
rently, an ancillary agreement was drafted which provided for the
substantive rules of trade, stating what was permitted and prohibited
and to what extent each country undertook to reduce its tariffs. This
agreement was called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or
GATT.3 6 However, when the ITO Convention (known as the Havana
Charter) was presented for ratification to the United States Congress,
it was met by the vehement opposition of members of the Senate.
They saw it as a serious threat to the sovereign power of the United
States (as well as to the powers of Congress) to determine trade policy
and economic policy as the United States saw fit without some inter-
32 See LUNG-CHu CmEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-
87 (1989).
33 See ANDREAS F. LowEN ELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw, VOL. VI, PuBLIc CON-
TROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 15-16 (2d ed. 1983).
34 Id. at 16.
35 Id. at 20.
36 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature on October 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194; T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter GATT].
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national body deciding for it what was to be allowed and what was to
be forbidden.37 When other countries in the world saw that the ITO
would not be ratified by the U.S. Congress, they too refused to ratify
it and, thus, the fate of the ITO was sealed. However, the GATT,
which had been signed in November 1947, came into force by virtue of
a Protocol of Provisional Application. 38 It began life without the insti-
tutional umbrella of the ITO and almost without administrative, su-
pervisory or enforcement procedures, but primarily with substantive
rules.
The absence of this institutional framework has been felt strongly
over the years, and there is no. doubt that it has impaired the effective-
ness of the substantive rules. Despite this, the demands of reality led
to the creation of some inferior substitutes to the institutions and pro-
cedures which were missing.3 9 Attempts made over the years to revive
the ITO or other types of legal enforcement procedures were always
met by opposition from numerous governments and so failed. 0 Only
recently, in the last round of talks conducted within the GATT frame-
work (the Uruguay Round) between 1986-1994,41 half a century after
the Bretton Woods Conference, was the historical circle completed
and the necessary international agreement obtained to establish the
WTO. This organization aims to provide the institutional framework
for the substantive rules contained in the GATT agreements, rules
which in the Meantime have grown and expanded immeasurably.42
Towards the end of 1994, the U.S. Congress ratified the new agree-
ment creating the WTO, although it possessed characteristics similar
37 Cf. LoWFrLD, supra note 33, at 20; William Diebold, The End of the I.T.O., PRINcETON
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 16 (1952).
38 See GATT, supra note 36.
39 Thus, for example, even though there is no reference in the GATT agreement to any
organizational structure, it is stated therein that decision in connection with the agreement will
be made by "the parties acting together", and not by any organization or body (see Article
XXV). This provision formed the basis for the de facto establishment of the "GATT Council"
which gathered at least once every six months to make decisions and settle trade disputes. In the
beginning GATT also had no secretariat and this problem too was resolved by a fiction; after the
Havana conference a temporary commission was set up to establish the international trade or-
ganization (ICITO) (which in fact was never established), and the secretariat of this commission
in practice served the needs of GATT. For details, see JACKSON, supra note 3, at 37-38.
40 Id. at 38.
41 For a detailed historical review of the measures taken in the Uruguay Round, see JOHN
CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1995).
42 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement].
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to those of the agreement which the Congress had consistently refused
to ratify since 1948.
The fifty-year history of the GATT agreement, a world regime
which is undoubtedly the most important and comprehensive of all
international trade agreements, provides the most prominent example
of the juridicization process argued for here. I will examine develop-
ments within this agreement in greater detail.
B. The Multiplication and Strengthening of Substantive Norms
As noted earlier, juridicization is expressed also by the multipli-
cation and strengthening of substantive norms. Perhaps the most con-
crete example of this phenomenon is the fact that the GATr of 1947
has expanded from an agreement of about eighty pages to an agree-
ment of some 26,000 pages in its most recent version signed in Mar-
rakesh in 1994! It is not only the longest agreement in the world, but
perhaps also the most important multilateral agreement since the sign-
ing of the UN Charter.43 From an agreement signed by twenty-three
countries, GAIT has grown into an organizational framework cur-
rently uniting 124 countries and the EC,44 as well as a dozen of other
countries which are in the process of joining. It has been transformed
from a provisional, short-term agreement45 into a permanent and
complex framework comprising more than 200 multilateral trade
agreements.
46
From the material point of view, an unmistakable process is tak-
ing place forging and spreading a system of norms which regulates the
entire range of policy measures in international trade and even be-
yond. We shall briefly identify the main elements of this process.
1. The Normative Regimes in relation to Non-Tariff Barriers
(NTBs)
The original GATT agreement, in fact, contained numerous arti-
cles intended to deal with Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). However,
many of these articles were drafted in an overly "weak" manner, al-
lowing States to evade them and maintain various types of barriers
without being deemed to breach the agreement. Further, the Protocol
43 Cf. Petersmann, supra note 4, at 1160.
44 Coomn, supra note 41.
45 See GATI', supra note 36. The GATr agreement was brought into temporary force in
1947 by the Protocol of Provisional Application with the hope that the Havana Charter would
soon be ratified, together with the ancillary GATT agreement.
46 See GATI, Status of Legal Instrument, 1993 ed. (Geneva: GATT, 1993).
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of Provisional Application, which gave the agreement its legal validity,
was subject to a "grandfathering" provision which protected legisla-
tion already in force in the acceding countries, even if that legislation
was contrary to GATr. 47
Consider, for example, the issue of product-standards, which was
often used as a convenient mechanism through which to implement a
protectionist policy under the pretext of safeguarding consumer safety
and product quality. Even though a mandatory product standard,
whose principal purpose is none other than the protection of local
products produced according to this standard, amounts to a "quantita-
tive restriction" (which is expressly prohibited by Article XI of
GAT), it falls within the special exception provided by subsection
2(b) of this Article, and would thus be permitted.48 Only at the end of
the 1970s, during the Tokyo Round, did the developed countries rec-
ognize the urgent need to deal with this serious trade barrier, and an
agreement ancillary to the GAIT was signed, namely "the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade," also known as "the Standards Code."
This agreement created a new system of rules and norms in relation to
the manner of creation and operation of standards with the purpose of
ensuring that they would not be used as a disguised barrier to trade.
However, only a minority of the GATT contracting parties, principally
the industrial nations, acceded to the new code. This is also the reason
why it was necessary to create a separate agreement, and it was not
possible to simply add the new rules to the existing GATT. Most of
the GAT parties opposed it, and it was not possible to amend the
GATT without their consent.49
A similar process may be seen with regard to other NTBs, such as
preferential treatment of local suppliers in government procurements,
import licensing, the use of anti-dumping procedures, and the be-
stowment of subsidies. The original GAIT provisions enabled the
continued use of these trade barriers, either because the issue was not
47 See GATI, supra note 36. See Article 1(b) of the Protocol of Provisional Application,
which applies Part II of the GATr agreement (the part which contains the provisions relating to
Non-Tariff Barriers) "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation."
48 Art. XI ("General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions"), para. 2(b) provides: "The
provisions of paragraph lof this Article shall not extend to... import... restrictions necessary to
the application of standards.. ." See GATr, supra note 36, art. XI(2)(b).
49 According to Article XXX of the GATT, amendments to the provisions of Part I of the
Agreement require the acceptance of all the GATT contracting parties. See GAIT, supra note
36, art. XXX. The provisions of the rest of the Agreement can be amended by a majority of two
thirds. It was usually impossible to gather even a two thirds majority, considering the fact that
most of the contracting parties were developing countries, reluctant to accept the advanced lib-
eralization sought by the industrialized parties. See JACKcSON, supra note 3, at 51-52.
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referred to at all or because the rules which were established were too
flexible and insufficiently "legal" (i.e., binding). Only during the To-
kyo Round, which ended in 1979, did some countries set up new and
separate normative structures for the purpose of regulating these
matters.
The process of juridicization in the field of norms did not end at
this stage, it continued and took a large step forward during the nego-
tiating round that ended in 1994. The progress is reflected on a
number of levels:
" The spread of the normative regime to numerous other countries and,
in practice, to all the parties to the GAIT. This result was achieved by
the transformation of the ancillary agreements from voluntary codes
open to accession at will to obligatory agreements which form part of
the so-called "single undertaking." Thus, it is not possible to be a
member of the new GATT and the WTO without being bound by all
the aforesaid agreements." What could not be done in the 1970s, in
other words, the ability to persuade the majority of GAIT parties to
agree to the strict rules in relation to NTBs, became feasible in 1994!
" The creation of completely new normative regimes on NTBs, for ex-
ample, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,5 1 the
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, 2 the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS),53 the Agreement on Safe-
guards,54 and more.
" The improvement and widening of existing regimes. Under this head-
ing we would include, inter alia: the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement,55 the Standards Code,56 the Dumping Code,57 and the
Subsidies Code.
5 8
50 This is true of all the ancillary agreements mentioned here except for the Agreement on
Government Procurement, which for a variety of reasons was left as a voluntary agreement (or
according to the GAIT terminology a "plurilateral" agreement). See Arie Reich, The New
GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: The Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reci-
procity (forthcoming in the April 1997 issue of the JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE).
51 WTO Agreement, supra note 42, Annex 1A:4.
52 Id. Annex 1A:10.
53 Id. Annex 1A:7.
54 Id. Annex 1A:14.
55 Published in URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 31 LEGAL IN-
s-RUMmENTs EMBODYING =HE RESULTS OF =sm URUGUAY ROUND (Geneva: GAIT Secretariat).
On the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, see Reich, supra note 50.
56 WTO Agreement, supra note 42, Annex 1A:6 (Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade).
57 Id. Annex 1A:8 (Agreement on Implementation of Article VI).
58 Id. Annex 1A:13 (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
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2. The Normative Regime in Relation to Subsidies
Another field which amply illustrates the juridicization process,
from the beginning of GATT in 1947 until today, is the international
regulation of subsidies.
Subsidies, the direct or indirect benefits given to business ele-
ments by the government, may artificially influence the flow of trade
and distort the efficient allocation of economic resources, both by re-
ducing imports and by increasing exports. Article XVI of the original
GATT deals with this problem using a mixture of "soft law" and
"hard law," the former being the clearly dominant component. The
sole duty provided in this Article which applies to all types of subsi-
dies affecting trade 9 is the duty to give notice in writing to the GATT
Council on the existence of such a subsidy, its extent, nature, and esti-
mated level of influence on trade, and on the circumstances making
the subsidization necessary. (Even this limited obligation was seldom
honored by the contracting parties.) The Article provides that if it is
determined that serious prejudice to the interest of any other con-
tracting party is caused or threatened by such subsidization, "discus-
sions" may be held between the subsidizing State and the injured
State concerning "the possibility of limiting" (but not eliminating!)
the subsidization. This, therefore, is a clear example of the very diplo-
matic and non-binding formulations generally used by the GATT.
The Article continues by concentrating on one category of subsi-
dies - export subsidies. While the Article proclaims the Parties' rec-
ognition of the harmful effects which such subsidies may have for
other contracting parties and recognizes their ability to hinder the
achievements of the objectives of GATr, the Article does not intro-
duce any operative provisions.6° The picture continues to narrow in
turning to a sub-category of export subsidies for "primary products,"' 61
although here too the wording is qualified ("contracting parties shall
seek to avoid.. ."). A real legal prohibition in fact only exists in rela-
tion to a very narrow band within the wide range of subsidies which
distort trade. This very narrow band includes only those export subsi-
dies within the range of primary products which result in the subsi-
59 That is, such a subsidy by one of the parties to the agreement "which operates directly or
indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its
territory" (from Article XVI:1).
60 Id. art. XVI:2.
61 "Primary products" are defined as "any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral,
in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare
it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade." See GATT, supra note 36, Annex
I, art. XVI(B)(2) (Interpretative Note).
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dizing State acquiring for itself more than "an equitable share" of
world export trade in that particular product.62
In the 1970s, within the framework of the Tokyo Code, great pro-
gress was made in this field, with the establishment of the Subsidies
Code which set up a system of rules which were stricter and less diplo-
matic than the GATT rules. Here, export subsidies for all industrial
products were decisively prohibited, without requiring any further
conditions to be met.63 Similarly, an annex was attached to the agree-
ment, providing an illustrative list of "export subsidies," in lieu of a
comprehensive definition of this term.6'
Nevertheless, there was still a wide range of subsidies which did
not fall within the ambit of the list and which could not be classified as
export subsidies. Some of these subsidies could potentially harm the
trade of other countries and the efficient allocation of economic re-
sources, even though they were not necessarily granted only in con-
nection with export. The Subsidies Code of the Tokyo Round was still
far from being an overall regulation of the subject. This was reflected
in difficult and acrimonious controversies between the large countries
regarding the definition of what was allowed or forbidden in this field
and in disputes having far-reaching economic repercussions. The fate
of entire industrial sectors were at stake, such as the civilian aircraft
industry: the European Airbus Co., on the one hand, and the Ameri-
can Boeing and McDonnel Douglas companies on the other. The
Americans accused the Europeans of unfair trade by awarding huge
sums in subsidies to the Airbus company, a large number of whose
aircrafts is exported to other countries, whereas the Europeans re-
sponded that Boeing enjoyed indirect governmental support in the
form of military R&D contracts awarded by the U.S. Department of
Defense. Resolving such disputes was extremely difficult in the ab-
sence of clear legal rules regarding subsidies and a binding legal mech-
anism for dispute settlement.
Recently, during the Uruguay Round, the GATT parties suc-
ceeded in reaching agreement on a general and comprehensive regime
62 See GATT, supra note 36, art. XVI(3). In relation to interpretation and application of this
requirement, see French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th
Supp.) at 46 (1958), for the decision of the Panel of 1958 on Australia's complaint against France
regarding a French subsidy for the export of wheat and wheat flour.
63 See Article 9 of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 56 (this
agreement is commonly referred to as the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code).
64 "Annex: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies". The Annex forms an integral part of the
agreement. See Article 19:10. Id.
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of binding definitions and rules concerning subsidies, which would
bind all the members of the WTO (and not just the few countries
which had previously joined the Code).65 The agreement offers, for
the first time, a comprehensive definition of the term "subsidy," while
dividing all types of subsidies into three categories: "prohibited subsi-
dies," 66 "actionable subsidies"'67 (i.e., subsidies which are actionable
only in certain circumstances, such as when they cause injury to an-
other Member State68), and "non-actionable subsidies" (i.e., permit-
ted subsidies).69
Even if the new agreement is not complete in terms of content
and will require extensive interpretation and implementation, there is
no doubt that it represents a big step forward when compared to the
earlier agreement and is an important milestone in the process of cre-
ating a stable and comprehensive legal system in a highly problematic
and sensitive area of international trade relations.
3. New Regimes in Services and Intellectual Property
Up to 1994, the GATT regime dealt solely with trade in goods.
However, additional economic resources exist which may be traded,
such as services and intellectual property. The agreement reached dur-
ing the Uruguay Round meets this deficiency by means of two new
agreements which create a normative framework to regulate these
areas.
65 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A:13 of The Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in TIm RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TiH LEGAL TExTs 1-46 (1994).
66 Id. This category contains two principal types:
A. Subsidies, as defined in Article 1, contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one
of several other conditions, upon export performance, including those set out in the
Illustrative List of Annex 1;
B. Subsidies which are contingent as aforesaid upon the use of domestic over imported
goods.
67 Id. pt. III.
68 Id. art. 5. This category refers to all types of subsidies, including those which are not ex-
port incentives. The article prohibits use of such a subsidy if it has "adverse effects" on the
interests of other States, such as injury to the domestic industry of another Member, or "nullifi-
cation or impairment of benefits" acruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT
1994. For the interpretation of the above term, which has been a key term in GATT dispute
settlement since its inception, see infra Part II, para. 3.1.
69 Id. pt. IV. This category includes subsidies which are not "specific" within the definition of
the agreement, as well as subsidies awarded to assist research and development (subject to cer-
tain limitations), to assist disadvantaged regions, and to provide assistance to promote adapta-
tion of existing facilities to new environmental requirements, which result in greater constraints
and financial burdens on firms.
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The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)70 is the
first step towards regulating the trade sector possessing the highest
rate of growth in the developed countries, with the purpose of attain-
ing gradual liberalization of this sector in the international arena. The
agreement is built on principles which are very similar to those of
GATT on goods.7 It also adopts the gradual approach of GAIT, em-
ploying protracted negotiations for the opening of selected service
sectors to international competition on the basis of reciprocity.
72
Under this approach, every State is obliged to grant "national treat-
ment" to the other GAT Member States in those service sectors
which it has agreed to open as aforesaid.7 3 Similarly, every State is
bound to the principle of "transparency," which requires it to publish
all the statutes, regulations, and administrative guidelines regulating
the right to supply services within its territory, and supply all the nec-
essary information in this regard.74 In this way, every foreign supplier
of services (such as banks, insurance companies, communications
companies, architects, or lawyers) will be able to know its rights and
obligations, and it will be possible to maintain surveillance on the par-
ties' implementation of their commitments. As noted, the agreement
is only a first step in the process of liberalizing this area, but it will
clearly become the future arena for the continuation of the juridiciza-
tion process.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPs)75 also regulates a field of major importance in the
modern economy. The agreement provides appropriate standards and
rules for the protection and exploitation of intellectual property
rights, such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, ge-
70 WTO Agreement, supra note 42, Annex 1B [hereafter GATS Agreement].
71 Compare GATS Agreement, supra note 70, art. II (Most-Favoured Nation Treatment),
art. XIV (General Exceptions), and art. XVII (National Treatment) with GATT, supra note 36,
art. I, art. XX, and art. III, respectively.
72 See GATS Agreement, supra note 70, art. XIX.
73 See id. art. XVII.
74 See id. art. III.
75 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Negotiation (the Uruguay Round),
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade and Coun-
terfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, arts. 22-24, 33 I.L.M. 81, 91-93 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agree-
ment]. For discussions on the TRIPs Agreement, see generally, Jasna Arsic, Combatting Trade in
Counterfeit Goods - The GATT and the EC Approaches, 18 WoRLD CoMPETInoN LAW & ECON.
Rnv. 75 (Mar. 1995); Paul E. Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of
TRIPS Dispute Settlements, 29 INr'L LAW. 99 (1995); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Stan-
dards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29
IN''L LAW. 345 (1995). For a discussion on the influence of TRIPs on the developing countries,
see Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPs: Intellectual Property Protection in the Devel-
oping Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1245 (1994).
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ographical indications, trade secret and integrated circuits.76 The
agreement was signed on the backdrop of widespread infringements,
particularly in the Far East, of intellectual property rights of Western
manufacturers, and the emergence of a huge counterfeiting industry,
which, in the opinion of many economists, seriously impairs the profit-
ability of investments in research and development of new inventions
and creations. The agreement is intended to ensure appropriate pro-
tection for these intellectual property rights by means of binding inter-
nal legislation in all GATT States. Inter alia, the Member States are
obliged to ensure the existence of legal enforcement procedures to
enable effective action against infringement of intellectual property
rights.77 Similarly, they are obliged to enable judicial review of all ad-
ministrative decisions relating to intellectual property rights.78
In this field, a number of international conventions have in fact
been in existence for many years.7 9 However, these agreements lacked
the strong enforcement mechanism of the WTO and were, therefore,
powerless in dealing with infringements.80 Similarly, many developing
countries, which had preferred not to accede to these conventions in
order not to harm their local industry, could now no longer afford not
to become members of the WTO.
C. The Evolution of GATT's Enforcement Mechanism
The juridicization process of trade relations is probably most
clearly reflected in the enforcement and dispute settlement mecha-
nism of GATT. The reason for this is evident; the ability to enforce a
norm or to impose a sanction for failure to obey it, is what largely
distinguishes "soft law" from "hard law." In the context of interna-
tional trade, the clash between the sovereignty of the State and the
international norm will be most apparent and publicly visible. On one
side will be the State's particular national interest (at least as per-
ceived by its government); on the other side will be the global eco-
nomic interest in the success of the international regime.
76 Uruguay Round Trade Agreement Draft Implementation Proposal, June 29, 1994, at
B(16), available in LEXIS Intlaw Library, GATT File.
77 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 75, art. 41(1).
78 Id. art. 41(4).
79 For example, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was last
amended in 1967, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
was last amended in 1971.
80 Lars-Henrik Knutrud, TRIPs in the Uruguay Round, in TBm NEw WoRLD TRADING SYs-
TEM: READINGS 193 (1994).
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1. Dispute Settlement in GATT up to 1994
As noted above, the Havana Charter, with its review and dispute
settlement mechanisms, was. rejected by the political organs of the
States, chief among them the U.S. Congress. Left in GATT itself was a
fairly feeble mechanism, primarily found in Article XXIII. Indeed,
many countries preferred a flexible and non-legalistic framework such
as this for settling trade disputes, in light of the political sensitivity of
such disputes and the need to preserve the sovereignty of the States.8'
In their view, dispute settlement within the GATT framework had to
be based on consultations, negotiations and diplomatic compromises.
The cause of action required to activate a dispute settlement pro-
cedure in GATT is not a "breach" of the agreement (as is the case in
most agreements) but, rather, a somewhat vague term unique to
GATT - "nullification or impairment of benefits."'  The term has
been interpreted as referring to the situation where the actions of one
State harm the trade of another State, thereby impairing the benefits
which the latter State was reasonably entitled to expect when negoti-
ating its obligations under the agreement.83 The use of this term'again
reflects the flight from legal categories and the preference for eco-
nomic-diplomatic categories. These latter categories prefer the sub-
stantive-concrete approach, which is directed towards the protected
commercial interest, over the formalistic-legal approach. Whereas the
term "breach" confers importance on the written word, the GAT?
term places emphasis on the reasonable economic expectations of the
parties to the agreement and on the principle of reciprocity 84 which
81 See, e.g., R. Phan van Phi, A European View ofthe GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAw. 150 (1986);
Lisa S. Klainman, Applying GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures to a Trade in Services Agree-
ment: Proceed with Caution, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 657 (1990). See also DAM, supra note 1,
at 356 (referring to the general recognition in the 1960s among the GATT contracting parties
that "legalism does not contribute to trade liberalization," in international trade in connection
with the dispute settlement mechanism).
82 GATT, supra note 36, art. XXIII. This term is both wider and more limited than the term
"breach." The term is more limited because it is necessary to prove impairment of the benefits
accruing to the complainant under the Agreement. A breach on its own, without any injury, is
insufficient. The term is wider because it is possible to have such impairments without any for-
mal breach of the provisions of GATT, and this will give rise to a right of complaint under the
Agreement.
83 Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Apr. 3, 1950, GATT B.I.S.D. (Vol. 2) at 188,
192-93 (1952). See also Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, Oct. 31, 1952, GATT
B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 53, 58-59 (1953).
84 The principle of reciprocity is central to GATT as demonstrated by its preamble: "Being
desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advanta-
geous arrangements. . ." GATI', supra note 36, preamble. GATT also states that in certain
types of negotiations and agreements, the contracting parties "shall endeavour to maintain a
general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions.. .2 Id. art. XXVIII.
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underlies it. It is also likely that the GATT approach reflects a gen-
eral skepticism in relation to the capacity of legal formulations to
close all the possible loopholes. Consequently, it also favors the abil-
ity to complain of violations which do not comprise a formal breach of
the provisions of the agreement.8 5
According to GATT, disputes between two States in relation to
the agreement may first be subjected to diplomatic consultations be-
tween the parties to the dispute. 6 In this framework, any complaining
State presents a written complaint to the other concerned State or
States.87 The latter State is obliged to agree to the complaining State's
request for consultations and examine its claims in good faith with the
aim of finding an agreed solution which will be to the satisfaction of
both parties.8 8 In the event that such a solution is not found, power is
given to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, i.e., the GAIT Council, to
investigate the matter and make "appropriate recommendations" to
the parties involved.8 9 If the State causing the injury, which often has
been found to be in breach of its commitments under GATT, refuses
to accept the recommendations, the GATT Council may then author-
ize the injured party to suspend the application to the injuring party of
such concessions or obligations under GATT "as they determine to
be appropriate in the circumstances." 90 In other words, the injured
State will in such case be authorized to take retaliatory measures
against the injuring State by way of non-fulfilment of certain obliga-
tions towards it, for example, through raising tariffs on certain prod-
ucts of that country or other similar measures.
However, the procedures for dispute settlement under the above-
mentioned Article were not specified in the agreement but, rather,
developed over the years through State practice until formulated in a
written Understanding in 1979.91 During the initial years, the parties'
tendency to distance themselves from any process of judicial character
was very evident. Instead, disputes were discussed in the plenary as-
sembly of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, where the participants
85 See generally Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, supra note 83, and Treatment
by Germany of Imports of Sardines, supra note 83.
86 GATr, supra note 36, art. XXIII.
87 Id.




91 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance, Nov. 28,1979, GATT B.I.S.D., (26th Supp.) at 210,216 (1980) [hereinafter Understanding
Regarding Dispute Settlement].
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:775 (1996-97)
were diplomats and where every decision had to be taken unani-
mously.92 Naturally, 'diplomats sought solutions which were acceptable
to all parties, including the party in breach of its obligations. Some of
the disputes were. also transferred to "working parties" which too
were made up of representatives of a number of countries. 93 These
representatives were not intended to be independent but could re-
ceive instructions from their governments with regard to the desired
solution to the particular dispute.94 In 1955, a change of approach
took place. Disputes were placed before a panel of neutral experts,
who would act according to their own understanding and not as repre-
sentatives of their governments.95 This change was a first step in the
juridicization process of dispute settlement under GATT away from a
system entirely based on negotiations within a multilateral diplomatic
framework toward a process much more legal in nature and whose
purpose is to objectively examine the facts and achieve a correct inter-
pretation of the provisions of the agreement.
Since then, the use of panels has prevailed. The panels are used
as bodies which fulfill the function of investigating the dispute placed
pursuant to Article XXIII before the CONTRACTING PARTIES
(which act through the GATr Council) and, afterwards, presenting
their conclusions and recommendations to the Council. However, au-
thority is retained by the Council, as provided in the above Article.
Accordingly, the recommendations of the panel have no binding effect
whatsoever unless adopted by the Council.9" Despite the fact that,
formally, the agreement allows decisions to be reached by majority
vote on the basis of one vote per State,97 in practice, all the work of
the Council is based on the de facto rule that all decisions are made
unanimously. 98 The application of this rule to dispute settlement pro-
92 HUDEC, supra note 4, at 29.
93 Id. at 29-30.
94 See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 95. See also Understanding Regarding Dispute Settlement,
supra note 91, Annex, art. 6(i).
95 See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 95. See also Understanding Regarding Dispute Settlement,
supra note 91, art. 14. This article states, "Panel members would serve in their individual capaci-
ties and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any organization. Govern-
ments would therefore not give them instructions nor seek to influence them as individuals with
regard to matters before a panel. Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the
independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of
experience."
96 See Understanding Regarding Dispute Settlement, supra note 91, art. 16.
97 See GATT, supra note 36, art. XXV.
98 See HUDEC, supra note 4, at 8. See also Pierre Pescatore et al., 1982 Ministerial Declara-
tion on Dispute Settlement, in HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATr DsptrE SErrEtMENT 21,23 (Kluwer
Law & Taxation Publishers, 1996).
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cedures creates the problematic situation in which the defending party
is able to "block" any such procedures directed against it. The power
to block is, in practice, available at every stage of the proceedings,
from the appointment of the panel, its composition, the formulation of
its terms of reference to the decision whether or not to adopt the rec-
ommendations of the panel. Even if the panel's recommendations are
adopted but the defendant refrains from obeying them, the latter's
consent is required to permit the retaliatory measures which the
GATT Council may authorize the injured State to take!
For an ordinary lawyer not familiar with the niceties of interna-
tional diplomacy, the need to obtain the agreement of the "losing"
party to adopt the decision against it, seems to deprive the entire pro-
ceedings of their significance and make them completely redundant.
In order to resolve a dispute by agreement, one may argue, there is
no need for an arbitration procedure. Indeed, why should a party
agree to stop violating its obligations if, in any event, it is not possible
to apply sanctions against it without its consent?
There is no doubt that the requirement of consensus significantly
impaired the legal nature of the GATT agreement and "the rule of
law" in the arena of international trade relations. However, it would
be a mistake to think that the GATT enforcement procedures were
worthless. On the contrary, this mechanism worked fairly well in
practice, considering the circumstances for almost fifty years, and this
is borne out by the fact that many States have utilized it. In the 1980s,
there was a 300% growth in the number of legal proceedings within
the GAIT framework. 99 Almost every application for the appoint-
ment of a panel was ultimately honored (even if occasionally after
lengthy delays), and most of the recommendations of the panels were
adopted in the end (again, on occasion after long delays). 100 Once
adopted, the recommendations were generally respected and imple-
mented by the States involved. Except for one case in the 1950s,10 it
99 See Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETNO THE URUGUAY ROUND: A RE-
SULTS ORIENTED APPROACH TO THIE URUGUAY RouND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180,182 (Jeffrey
J. Schott ed., 1990).
100 Id. at 181-82.
101 This was the case involving a dispute between Holland and the United States regarding
U.S. restrictions on the import of milk products from Holland. Following a complaint by Hol-
land which was found to be justified, Holland was empowered to take retaliatory measures
against the United States. Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United
States, Nov. 8,1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953). Even though authorized to impose
quotas on grain imports from the United States for seven consecutive years, the Netherlands
never made use of their power because of the ineffectiveness of this measure against such a large
country as the United States. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 96.
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never became necessary to take retaliatory steps against a State refus-
ing to honor the recommendations of the Council.10 2 However, the
blocking power was frequently exploited by States which were the
subjects of complaints at preliminary stages of the process. Often the
blocking led only to delays.. Sometimes, however, the defendant State
succeeded in extracting a legal or procedural advantage by virtue of
its blocking power. 103 Occasionally, an injured party was forced to
compromise and accept only a partial implementation of the panel's
recommendations.
0 4
The explanation for the fact that the mechanism nevertheless
worked in a reasonable fashion up to the 1980s lies in the mutual in-
terest of all the GATT Parties in the efficient functioning of the agree-
ment. The Fourth part of this article will discuss more extensively the
considerations and interests operating in this area. At this stage, it is
sufficient to point to the fact that a State which today finds itself losing
in a legal proceeding before a GATr panel may tomorrow find itself
winning another such proceeding. Just as the State expects that a de-
cision in its favour is honored, it is clear that it must also honor a
decision given against it. There is a significant difference between a
situation where a State is involved in a trade dispute where no impar-
tial ruling on the disputed question has been delivered (and when
State officials often have a myriad of arguments to justify their ac-
tion) and the situation where all the arguments have already been
heard and rejected by a panel of independent arbitrators. No State is
keen to be regarded as an "international offender" in the eyes of the
international community. At this stage, refusal to abide by the deci-
sion of the arbitrators, a decision which enjoys support of other
GATT parties who are willing to adopt it, is tantamount to undermin-
ing the entire regime of GATT in which all parties have a vested inter-
est. Nevertheless, this important consideration is only one of the
102 In 1988-1989, the United States in fact blocked two requests to authorize retaliatory steps,
one made by the European Community and the other by Canada, by refusing for a period of 3
years to abide by the GATT Council decision against one of the United States tax laws which
were found to be contrary to the provisions of the agreement. See Hudec, supra note 99, at 184.
103 Hudec, supra note 99, at 182.
104 Thus, for example, in the dispute between Mexico and the United States in relation to the
restrictions on the import of tuna, Mexico agreed not to demand the full adoption and enforce-
ment of the decision made in its favor. Restrictions on Imports of 'una, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 155 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991). The United States made only partial
amendments to its domestic legislation which had been found to be in breach of the GATT rules.
A number of infringing laws were not modified as shown by the later filing by the European
Community of the second complaint made in this regard. For a review of these proceedings, see,
e.g., Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna H: New Possibilities for GATT-Compliant Environ-
mental Standards, 5 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247 (1996).
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considerations likely to guide the decision-makers. It may very well be
counter-balanced by weighty internal political interests at odds with
the decision and in favor of maintaining the protectionist measure. In
such a case, a politician may be tempted to prefer his own short-term
interests over the long-term interests of his State.
From the above, it is clear that the possibility of blocking legal
proceedings impairs the effectiveness of the enforcement procedures
of GAT, and, to use Professor Jackson's terminology, opens the door
to "power oriented diplomacy" instead of "rule oriented
diplomacy."'105
2. Dispute Settlement in GATT Following the Uruguay Round
The juridicization process of the GATT enforcement procedures
reached its present climax following the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations (Uruguay Round). The dispute resolution
agreement resulting from the Uruguay Round has been described as a
triumph of the lawyers over diplomats. 0 6
This agreement reached during the Uruguay Round surprised
many, including many commentators, in view of the fact that, at the
outset of the negotiations, most of the parties opposed the repeal of
the consensus requirement and the vetoing power which in effect con-
ferred on every State.10 7 They were of the opinion that, in any event,
the GATT rules would never be sufficiently strong to force rejectionist
States to obey. 08 They believed that it would be preferable to retain
the flexibility which the existing mechanism allowed the parties with
regard to their obligations.0 9 The more flexible mechanism made the
parties more willing to accept far-reaching obligations with the knowl-
edge that, in difficult cases, they would always have a certain way
out."
0
105 See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 85-88. Thus, for example, Prof. Hudec points to 17 cases of
significant use of the blocking power in 57 legal determinations delivered by GATr panels be-
tween the years 1957-1989. See Hudec, supra note 99, at 183.
106 See Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round. Lawyers Triumph over
Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 406 (1995) (describing how the dispute resolution process under
GATr after the Uruguay Round appears "very judicial and adjudicatory in character and
application").
107 Hudec, supra note 99, at 184.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 185.
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In the "Midterm Agreement" on dispute settlement, drafted in
1989 prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round,111 the parties reit-
erated their commitment to the requirement of consensus,112 while re-
jecting the proposal for "consensus minus two,' 11 3 which provided for
consensus of all of the Members of GATT less the two disputing par-
ties. Nevertheless, the Midterm Agreement represents a further mile-
stone in the juridicization process, as a number of other improvements
were incorporated into the Midterm Agreement which have the effect
of strengthening the enforcement process of dispute settlement. For
example, one improvement contained in the Midterm Agreement is
the provision for a maximum time-table for the different stages of the
dispute resolution process which is designed to prevent protracted de-
lays during arbitration of disputes." 4 Similarly, a number of provi-
sions were made with the aim of eliminating the power to block the
dispute resolution process in the early stages of a dispute in order to
secure the completion of the arbitration process."' As will be seen,
these provisions were ultimately incorporated in the final agreement
of the Uruguay Round (Final Act), 16 which introduced the most sig-
nificant modification to the existing dispute resolution process.
Upon the establishment of the WTO in 1994 by the Final Act,
117
the GATT dispute settlement mechanism received appropriate institu-
tional support in the form of a new organ, the Dispute Settlement
111 Conciliation, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1990) [hereinafter Midterm Agreement].
112 Id. art. G.3.
113 Hudec, supra note 99, at 186.
114 The Midterm Agreement provided that the initial bilateral consultation process must end
within 60 days. Midterm Agreement, supra note 111, art. C.2. If the dispute is not settled within
this period of time, the complainant State may request the appointment of a panel. Id. It is
further provided that this request will be heard and decided at the most at the second meeting of
the GATE Council, following the presentation of the request. Id. art. F(a). However, there is no
express provision for the right of the complainant to a panel in relation to his complaint.
115 Standard terms of reference for the arbitrators were provided. Midterm Agreement,
supra note 111, art. F(b). In practice, these were built on the complaint presented by the com-
plainant, save where the parties agreed on a different formulation. Id. Similarly, power was
conferred upon the Director-General of GATE to appoint the members of the panel in the
absence of agreement between the parties. Id. art. F(c)(5).
116 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Apr. 15,1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
117 Id. at 1143 para. 1. In the Final Act, the participants of the Uruguay Round agreed to the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. See Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, reprinted in Final Act, supra note 116, at 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment]. The WTO Agreement establishes the WTO. WTO Agreement, supra note 42, art. 1.
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Body (DSB).118 As evidenced by its name, the DSB is concerned
solely with the settlement of trade disputes in connection with the
GATT accord.119 The DSB is composed of representatives from all
the VTO members.120 In dealing with disputes, the DSB acts in ac-
cordance with the rules set out in the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which is an-
nexed to the WTO Agreement.121 These rules are primarily based on
the panel system, as developed over the years and as improved in the
1979 and 1989 agreements. 22 However, in the DSU, a number of
very important changes were made to the dispute resolution process
which may be justly characterized as a revolution in the GATT ap-
proach to dispute settlement. As discussed below, the important
changes illustrating the juridicization process in the dispute resolution
process include: (1) the affirmation of the exclusive character and
legal primacy of the DSU dispute resolution. system; (2) the establish-
ment of a strict time table for each stage in the dispute resolution
process; (3) the revocation of the power to block procedures; (4) the
duty to terminate the infringement of GATT; (5) the duty to adopt the
panel's recommendations; (6) the establishment of an appellate body;
(7) surveillance on the implementation of recommendations and rul-
ings; (8) restrictions on the non-legal grounds of complaint; and (9)
possibility of cross-retaliation.
a. The Affirmation of the Exclusive Character and Legal Primacy
of DSU Dispute Resolution
Under the heading "Strengthening of the Multilateral System,"
Article 23 of the DSU sets out several obligations whose aim is to
ensure that in case disagreements, VTO Members will not have re-
course to any alternative dispute settlement methods outside the
118 The WTO Agreement provides that the WTO will administer the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. WTO Agreement, supra note 109, art.
111:3. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes is
annexed to the Final Act. See Final Act, supra note 116, Annex 2, 33 1.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter
DSU]. The DSU establishes the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Id. art. 2.1.
119 See DSU, supra note 118, art. 2.1.
120 The WTO Agreement creates a General Council which is composed of all Members.
WTO Agreement, supra note 42, art. IV:2. Under the WTO Agreement, the General Council
will convene to discharge the responsibilities of the DSB. Id. art. IV:3. Thus, the DSB is com-
posed of all Members.
121 See Final Act, supra note 116, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1226.
122 See generally Midterm Agreement, supra note 111, art. F (describing panel and working
party procedures).
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WTOY23 It also clearly precludes any unilateral action by one Mem-
ber against another, justified for example by the claim that obligations
*have been violated. Members are required to first obtain a determi-
nation to that effect through the DSU process, 124 and may only sus-
pend concessions or other obligations following an authorization by
the DSB. 1' Unilateral unauthorized trade sanctions, such as those
employed in the past under the U.S. Section 301, would therefore be
inconsistent with GATT.
126
b. The Establishment of a Strict Tune Table for Each Stage in the
Process
Some of the provisions with regard to establishing strict time ta-
bles for the dispute resolution process are taken from the Midterm
Agreement of 1989.127 Maximum time periods are set for consulta-
tion,'128 the establishment and composition of panels,'129 panel hearings
and the delivery of panel decisions, 30 the process of adopting the rec-
ommendations of the panel,' and, finally, for implementation of the
recommendations. 32
c. Revocation of the Power to Block Procedures
Following the example of the Midterm Agreement, the DSU
adopts the "default mechanism" in order to prevent the possibility of
an interested party blocking the process. Thus, a panel will be estab-
lished if a complainant party so requests, unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to create a panel.133 The terms of reference of the
123 DSU, supra note 118, Article 23:1. This provision requires Members who seek redress of a
violation of WTO obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits to "have recourse
to, and abide by" the rules and procedures of the DSU.
124 Id. art. 23:2(a).
125 Id. art. 23:2(c).
126 On this debated issue, see, e.g., SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMIssION, REPORT ON
THE UNrTED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVEsTMENT 7 (1994) (arguing that U.S. efforts
to renew "Super 301" are inconsistent with WTO provisions); JOHN JACKSON, DxsPUTr SETr=E-
MENT PROCEDURES iN OECD, THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: Readings 117,120 (1994);
and Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliatiorn Adjudicating the Use
of Section 301 Before the WTO 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233 (1996).
127 See generally Midterm Agreement, supra note 111.
128 See DSU, supra note 118, art. 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11.
129 Id. arts. 6.1, 8.5, 8.7.
130 Id. arts. 12.5, 12.8, 12.12, 15.2, 15.3.
131 Id. arts. 16.1, 16.2, 16.4.
132 Id. art. 21.3-.6.
133 Id. art. 6.1.
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panel are standard unless the parties agree to another formulation.'34
The standard terms of reference delineate the boundaries of the
panel's jurisdiction over the dispute and the legal issues raised in the
complainant's request for the establishment of a panel.135 Thus, the
complainant is in effect given the right to define the substantive juris-
diction of the panel, and defendants can no longer block various legal
issues or claims from being heard by the panel. Furthermore, the
panel is expressly required to address the relevant provisions in any
agreement cited by the parties to the dispute, 36 another indication of
the legal nature of the proceedings.
Likewise, various provisions are introduced in the DSU regarding
the composition of the panels. The DSU provides that panel members
will be selected from a list of well-qualified individuals, compiled by
the DSB secretariat and including both government officials and pri-
vate persons. 137 These panelists will be independent and will possess
the widest possible qualifications and experience.13 The panelists will
also be citizens of countries other than those of the litigants or of the
third parties involved in the dispute.139 If the parties disagree as to
the composition of the panel, the Director General of the WTO, "in
consultation with the Chairman of the relevant Council of Commit-
tee," shall appoint the members of the panel. 140
d. The Duty to Terminate the Infringement of GATT
For the first time, the GATT dispute resolution process provides
binding instructions on the preferred course of action in cases of in-
fringements. Panels which have found a certain measure to be incon-
sistent with a covered agreement must recommend that the infringing
State "bring the measure into conformity with that agreement."' 41 In
134 Id. art. 7.1. Article 7.1 provides the following default terms of reference, "To examine, in
the light of the relevant provisions in (name of covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the
dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document.. .and to make such
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided
for in that/those agreement(s)." Id.
135 Id. art. 7.1
136 Id. art. 7.2.
137 Id. arts. 8.1, 8.4.
138 Id. art. 8.2.
139 Id. arts. 8.2, 8.3.
140 Id. art. 8.7.
141 Id. art. 19.1. In addition, where the recommendations or rulings of the panel are not imple-
mented within a reasonable period of time, the DSU provides for temporary compensation (gen-
erally meaning an alternative benefit and not a money payment) and suspension of concessions
or other obligations. Id. art. 22.1. However, compensation and suspension of concessions should
not be preferred to bringing the infringing measure into conformity with GATT.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:775 (1996-97)
the past, no such instruction existed. Past panels that found measures
inconsistent with GATT refrained from demanding the termination of
the breach, but were satisfied with action which had the effect of com-
pensating the injured parties or preventing the injury to them.142
Therefore, the new provision entrenches the binding effect of GATI"
law.
e. The Duty to Adopt the Panel's Recommendations
In contrast to the situation prevailing in GATI for close to fifty
years, in which the adoption of the recommendations had to be by
consensus, today the position is completely different. Within sixty
days from the publication of the panel report, DSB is obliged to adopt
the report unless there is a consensus not to adopt them.143 Not only
have WTO Members now agreed to waive the requirement of unani-
mous adoption, something they refused to do in 1989, but, in practice,
they have also completely waived the "political filter" in the form of
the GATT) Council with regard to the legal determinations of the
panels. The current dispute resolutioii procedures do not provide for a
majority decision or a "consensus minus two," which, under an Uru-
guay Round proposal, would require a majority excluding the two
States involved in the dispute. Instead, the current procedures have
created a process where the recommendations of the panels are auto-
matically adopted, except where the winning State itself agrees that
they should not be adopted.
f. The Establishment of an Appellate Body
As a replacement for the political review over the panels' recom-
mendations, the States agreed to establish a legal system of appeals
(the Appellate Body).1" This instance, contrary to the panels previ-
ously established ad hoe for each specific dispute, is a permanent body
whose function is to hear appeals against the decisions of the panels
on legal questions only.145 Therefore, here we have a formal and offi-
cial recognition of the legal facet of the GATIT regime and the need to
142 See, for example, the decision in the dispute between Australia and France in relation to
the subsidy on wheat. French Assistance to Export of Wheat and Wheat Flour, Nov. 22, 1958,
GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 22 (1959).
143 DSU, supra note 118, art. 16.4. In addition, the DSB is not obliged to adopt the panel's
decision if one of the parties to the dispute has given notice of its intention to appeal the panel's
decision.
144 See generally, DSU, supra note 118, art. 17.
145 Id. art. 17:6. "An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and
legal interpretations developed by the panel." Id.
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give it a uniform and binding legal interpretation. To hear appeals,
the DSB will establish a standing Appellate Body.
14 6 The Appellate
Body will be comprised of seven permanent members "of recognized
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and
the subject matter of the covered agreements generally.'
14 7 The deci-
sion of the Body shall also be adopted by the DSB, unless there is a
consensus not to adopt it.
148
The establishment of the Appellate Body has enormous potential
to entrench the juridicization process within the GATT framework.
Even though formally, a decision of the Appellate Body is only bind-
ing upon the parties to the dispute in that particular case, in practice
GATT panels customarily do rely on past precedents, and the Appel-
late Body's rulings and interpretations are very likely to enjoy de facto
status of stare decisis. The body will therefore be able to ensure a
uniform and consistent development of GATT jurisprudence, in con-
trast to the sporadic and occasionally inconsistent panel decisions
given to date. This jurisprudence will be able to guide the legal advi-
sors of the WTO Members, as well as future panels whose decisions
will be subject to review by the Appellate Body. It is difficult not to
draw an analogy to the EC Court of Justice. If the GATT Appellate
Body succeeds in achieving even a small part of what has been
achieved by the EC Court of Justice, it would be of great value. It is,
of course, quite unlikely that the Appellate Body of the WTO will be
able to follow a policy of teleological interpretation and judicial activ-
ism such as that adopted by the EC Court of Justice. Not only are
political constraints at play here, but there also exists an express pro-
vision prohibiting the panels and Appellate Body from adding or de-
tracting from "the rights of obligations set out in the agreements.'
'14 9
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body will be able to supply an agreed
upon and clear interpretation of the existing provisions, thereby
resolving some of the intense conflicts in international trade law.
g. Surveillance on the Implementation of Recommendations and
Rulings
The DSB has a duty to follow-up the implementation of the
panels' recommendations and receive reports from the State required
146 Id. art. 17.1.
147 Id. arts. 17:1, 17:3.
148 Id. art. 17:14.
149 Id. art. 19:2. Of course, the institutional difference and the differences between the in-
tegrative and political aims of the European Court of Justice, and those of the Appellate Body of
the WTO, will dictate greater conservativism in the latter body.
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to act thereunder.1 50 The period of time allowed for implementing
the recommendations is determined by the DSB or by agreement of
the parties to the dispute.' 5 1 It is also possible to proceed to binding
arbitration in order to solve a disagreement on this point and to deter-
mine the reasonable period of implementation.1
52
h. Restrictions on the Non-Legal Grounds of Complaint
The non-legal grounds of complaint in GATT, otherwise called
the Non-Violation Nullification or Impairment of Concessions,
153
have not been repealed. However, various restrictions have been im-
posed on them in order to narrow their scope and application. The
DSU provides, "where a measure has been found to nullify or impair
benefits under, or impede the attainment of objectives, of the rele-
vant covered agreement without violation thereof, the panel, or Ap-
pellate Body, must recommend that the Member concerned make a
mutually satisfactory adjustment,'1 54 but there is no obligation to with-
draw the measure.
i. Possibility of Cross Retaliation
It should be recalled that even if the panel's recommendations
are adopted and become binding, there is of course no international
"execution office" to enforce the panel's recommendations. Armed
forces are not likely to be sent to enforce the injuring State's obliga-
tions under a trade agreement. Accordingly, the most extreme en-
forcement measure available takes the form of retaliatory action by
the injured State against the injuring State with the authorization of
the DSB. 155 The new agreement enables-the injured State, provided
that all diplomatic efforts have failed and that retaliatory measures in
that sector and under the agreement in question are not practical, to
take retaliatory measures in other sectors and to suspend obligations
under other covered agreements. 156 For example, if a developing
country is injured in the export of its merchandise to a developed
country such as the United States, the developing country may in cer-
tain cases request permission to suspend its obligations to the United
150 See generally, id. art. 21.
151 Id. art. 21.3(a)-(b).
152 Id. art. 21.3(c).
153 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
154 DSU, supra note 118, art. 26.1(b) (emphasis added).
155 See generally id. art. 22.
156 Id. "Covered Agreements" includes only the agreements that fall under the binding um-
brella of the GATT 1994 and that are listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU. Id. art. 1.1.
Juridicization of Trade Relations
17:775 (1996-97)
States under the covered agreements relating to intellectual property
or trade in services, a step which may prove to be more effective than
imposing restrictions on U.S. goods. This right to suspend obligations
under other covered agreements, known as the right to "cross retalia-
tion," greatly strengthens retaliation as a sanction. Accomplished dur-
ing the Uruguay Round, "cross retalition" is the result of the
integration of all the GATT agreements and their transformation into
one binding complex.' 57 Therefore, the enforcement measures avail-
able to the WTO are much more efficient than those available to
other branches of public international law, and it suffices to recall the
famous Corfu Channel case' 58 in which there was no practical way of
forcing Albania to pay the compensation awarded to the United
Kingdom.
3. Evaluation of the New Mechanism
It is important to emphasize that this new mechanism still has not
been tested in the short period of time since it came into force. A
number of complaints have already been made against the dispute res-
olution mechanism. It will be very interesting to examine the func-
tioning of the new mechanism, in particular, the political willingness
of governments to honor the new dispute resolution mechanism and
accept its determinations, especially when they are not favorable from
an internal-political point of view.
One danger which recently threatened the mechanism, but which
has since passed, is the intense dispute between the United States and
Japan regarding the automobile trade.' 59  The United States
threatened to take unilateral retaliatory action against Japan in open
violation of all the WTO principles, which require the transfer of dis-
putes to an objective mechanism. Japan had already filed a complaint
to the WTO regarding the blatant use by the United States of Section
301 of the United States Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988.160 Had the issue been brought before a Panel, there is hardly a
157 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
158 See the decision of the International Court of Justice in the dispute between England and
Albania over liability for explosions in the Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9, 1949). By ten
votes to six, the court reserved for consideration "the assessment of the amount of compensa-
tion." Id. at 36.
159 William Drozdiak, U.S., Japan Reach Trade Deal, Averting Sanctions, WASH. PosT, June
29, 1995, at Al; see also David E. Sanger, U.S. Settles Trade Dispute, Averting Billions in Tariffs
on Japanese Luxury Autos, N.Y. TimEs, June 29, 1995, at Al (detailing the events relating to the
U.S.-Japanese settlement).
160 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 301, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (1980 and
Supp. 1996). The procedures under Section 301 of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
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doubt that a decision would have been delivered rejecting the unilat-
eral use by the United States of retaliatory measures prior to applying
for a dispute settlement procedure and without the agreement of the
DSB. However, at the last minute, the parties reached a compromise
and the conflict was avoided. The mere existence of the DSB, the fear
of a panel decision unfavorable to the United States, and the possible
collapse of the trade regime in the event that the United States ig-
nored such an unfavorable decision were undoubtedly the factors that
contributed to the United States' acceptance of the compromise. This
incident is instructive in the sense that, in the arena of future interna-
tional trade relations, there will still be room for threats as well as for
international diplomacy. However, future international diplomacy
will always be conducted in the shadow of the international law and
enforcement mechanisms developed in recent years.
III. JURIDICIZATION ON THE BILATERAL LEVEL: TRADE
RELATIONS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
The evolutionary process which has transformed the multilateral
framework of GAIT may also be identified in regional and bilateral
frameworks. It is of course impossible, in this setting, to examine the
history of all such frameworks in order to demonstrate the
juridicization process at work. It is sufficient to point to the prolifera-
tion of regional trade agreements in all regions of the world over the
past decades, to the broadening of their scope and to the strengthen-
ing of their legal mechanisms.161 In addition to the constantly evolv-
ing European Community, regional integration arrangements and
initiatives such as NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and APEC are
some of the more prominent examples of this trend. Here, I shall con-
fine myself to my own region and examine the history of Israel's bilat-
eral trade agreements in order to prove the universal nature of the
juridicization process.
161
Act of 1988 include a number of grounds and ways of acting with respect to which the govern-
ment has a duty to act to open foreign markets by means of unilateral retaliatory measures, or
threat of such measures, against a State by reason of its trading policy. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-
16. See also JACKSON, supra note 3, at 103-07 (discussing the use made of these legal provisions);
JAGDiSH BRAGWATI, TmE WoRLD TRADINr SYsram AT RisK 48-57, 126-40 (1991).
161 See, e.g., Andrew H. Hallet & Carlos A. Primo Braga, The New Regionalism and the
Threat of Protectionism, Policy Research Working Paper 1349, The World Bank, 1994; John H.
Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and GATT, 16 2 Tim WoRuD EcoNoMY 121-31 (1993).
162 For a general overview of Israel's economy and foreign trade policy, see GATT SECRETA-
wAT, GATr, TRADE Poucy REvmw: ISRAEL 1-2 (1995).
Juridicization of Trade Relations
17:775 (1996-97)
A. Israel's Trade Relations with the EC up to 1995
Since its establishment in 1958, the EC has been the most impor-
tant trading partner of the State of Israel. The more the EC expanded,
the greater became its importance for Israel, particularly as a source
for imports but also as a destination for Israel's exports. Thus, in 1994,
51% of the total goods imported to Israel originated in the EC,
whereas 28.1% of total exports were directed there.1 63 At the same
time, the North-American market has increased in importance as a
destination for Israeli exports. In 1994, it obtained a 31.7% share of
total Israeli exports.164
1. The Trade Agreement of 1964
The first trade agreement between Israel and the EC was signed
in 1964.165 This agreement was very limited in scope. It applied only to
a number of industrial goods and agricultural produce and did not
even require the elimination of tariffs, but only partial reduction of
custom duties and partial or total elimination of certain quantitative
restrictions. The agreement did not contain any dispute settlement or
enforcement mechanisms. 66 Further, the benefits given to the State of
Israel by the agreement were later given to ali GATT signatories,
thereby in effect eroding its impact. In consequence, negotiations
commenced for the signing of a new agreement.
2. Trade Agreement of 1970
Discussions in this regard commenced in June 1967. However,
for political reasons, France imposed a veto on the renewal of con-
tacts. Only in 1970, after the opposition was withdrawn, was a new
preference agreement signed for a period of five years. 67 The scope
of the new agreement was broad compared to the earlier agreement.
163 STATE OF ISRAEL, MINISTRY OF INDusTRY & TRADE, THE ISRAELI ECONOMY AT A
GLANCE 2-3 (1995).
164 Id.
165 Council Decision No. 64 Treaties of the State of Israel 15, p. 683 (Hebrew); Yaacov Cohen,
Implications of a Free Trade Area Between the EEC and Israel, 10 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 252
(1976).
166 In fact a joint committee was set up comprising representatives of both sides for the pur-
pose of reviewing the performance of the agreement, but it was empowered only to "propose to
the competent bodies the measures which appeared to it to be appropriate" for the improvement
of trade exchange. 1965 Agreement, Article 6. It did not serve as a dispute settlement body, and
there is no reference in the agreement to the issues of dispute settlement or enforcement
measures.
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Still, only about two-thirds of Israeli industrial exports and only a
small part of its agricultural produce were covered by the 1970 agree-
ment. The agreement did not lead to elimination of tariffs but only to
a partial reduction thereof.1 68 The agreement was not based on recip-
rocal concessions but was in the nature of a preference agreement be-
tween a developed country and a developing country, in which the
latter was not required to give full consideration. 69 The agreement
was very primitive in relation to any matter outside the specific tariff
obligations, and, apart from the reference to the GATT agreements
with regard to dumping practices and the grant of subsidies,'170 there
were also no provisions whatsoever relating to non-tariff barriers.
Like the 1964 agreement, the 1970 agreement failed to introduce any
mechanism for dispute settlement or enforcement.
171
3. Agreement for the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, 1975 -
First Generation FTAs
A few years later, following the expansion of the EC (the acces-
sion of England, Ireland and Denmark) and the significant growth in
trade between the parties, it was recognized that there was a need to
create a general and comprehensive framework for the development
of the economic relations between the parties.17 z This initiative was
part of the EC's "Global Program for the Mediterranean Countries."
This program aimed to establish bilateral agreements between the EC
and all the countries of the Mediterranean which would take the form
of agreements to establish free trade areas (FTAs) for industrial
goods. Such an agreement was signed between Israel and the EC in
1975.'73
168 See Cohen, supra note 165, at 252.
169 See GATI, supra note 36, art. XXXVI (added in 1966), regarding the relations between
developing and developed countries, which provides, inter alia, that in these relations the devel-
oped countries shall not expect reciprocity in terms of their undertakings towards the developing
countries.
170 1970 Agreement, supra note 167, art. IX.
171 See generally supra note 165.
172 Cohen, supra note 165, at 253.
173 Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel, May 20,
1975, Isr.-E.E.C., 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 136) (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Agreement]. For an
extensive discussion of the 1975 Agreement, see TALIA E NHORN, THE ROLE OF THm FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE EEC: THm LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRADING
WITH ISRAEL BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Baden-Baden: Nomos Recht, 1994); J.H.H.
Weiler, Israel and the EEC: A New Legal Model for Trade and Cooperation, 3 JEWISH L. ANN.
196; S.H. Langer, The Israel-EEC Free Trade Agreement: An Analysis of the Agreement and its
Effdct on Investments, 9 SYR. J. INV'L L. & COM. 63 (1982).
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The 1975 agreement was Israel's first free trade agreement with
any country. It set the stage for numerous other agreements, which
will be discussed later. This agreement created the first general sub-
stantive framework for regulating the two parties' trade relations on
the basis of a gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barri-
ers. It was this agreement, and not the fifteen-year membership in
GATI, which gave the first push towards real liberalization of Israel's
foreign trade policy. Nevertheless, the agreement must be classified as
a "first generation" FTA agreement, in terms of its "juridical" nature,
as defined above. This is true both on the substantive level, principally
in relation to the manner of regulation of non-tariff barriers, and on
the institutional level, i.e., dispute settlement and enforcement mecha-
nisms. This claim shall be proved hereunder by pointing to some of
the limitations and flaws of the agreement.
a. Limitations on the Substantive Level
The primary function of the FrA agreement of 1975 was un-
doubtedly the gradual elimination of tariffs on trade in goods. Here,
special consideration was given to the State of Israel in light of its
economic level of development at that time, and, therefore, the reduc-
tion of Israeli tariffs was performed over a period of fourteen years
until their final elimination in 1989.14 EC tariffs on goods from Israel,
in contrast, were eliminated within one and one-half years of the sign-
ing of the agreement. 75 However, the elimination of tariffs applied
only to industrial goods; in the area of agriculture, tariffs were not
eliminated, and other trade barriers, such as quotas and subsidies,
were also maintained.1
76
174 Originally, the reduction was due to be completed by 1985 under Protocol 2 of the 1975
Agreement, but Israel utilized its right under Article 22 of the agreement and requested two
postponements of 2 years each. See Council Regulation No. 1008181, 1981 J.O. (102) 1 (present-
ing Second Additional Protocol to E.C.-Israel FTA that extended time-table from January 1,
1985, to January 1, 1987); and Council Regulation No. 3565/84, 1984, J.O. (332) 1 (presenting
Third Additional Protocol that extended time-table to January 1, 1989). Accordingly, Israeli
tariffs on EC industrial goods were in fact eliminated only on January 1, 1989.
175 Reduction of EC tariffs are regulated in Protocol No. 1 of the agreement, under which a
100% reduction was carried out by January 7, 1977 on industrial products, other than those
special exceptions enumerated in Protocol 1 of the 1975 Agreement.
176 See 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, Protocol 1. This protocol provides for only limited
reduction of tariffs in relation to processed agricultural products. Similarly, Article 5 of the 1975
Agreement provides that the prohibitions on the imposition of new tariffs and quotas provided
in Articles 3 and 4 will not apply to agricultural products listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty of
Rome. Accordingly, specific arrangements were made in relation to agricultural products, and
Article 7 of the 1975 Agreement provides that these arrangements will be subject to amendment
in the event of a change in the agricultural policy of one of the parties.
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In relation to the regulation of non-tariff barriers, the agreement
is somewhat lacking. There is a general prohibition in Article 3 on the
imposition of any new customs duties or "charges having equivalent
effect," as well as any quantitative restrictions or "measures having
equivalent effect." 177 Similar provisions are found in the Treaty of
Rome which established the EEC, 78 in Articles 12 (charges with
equivalent effect) and 30 (quantitative restrictions and measures with
equivalent effect), and there they have been given a broad interpre-
tation by the European Court of Justice.17 9 However, the FTA agree-
ment does not feature an international judicial tribunal equivalent to
the European Court, and it is not clear whether such interpretation
would also be acceptable here. In any event, Article 3 only applies to
restrictions on imports, whereas restrictions on exports are subject to
Article 4. This latter provision is narrower and does not prohibit quan-
titative restrictions or measures of equivalent effect. On the basis of
this distinction, the United Kingdom, for example, placed an embargo
on the export of oil to Israel, a prohibition which could not be at-
tacked under the terms of the agreement.8 0
The agreement does contain provisions prohibiting the operation
of discriminatory measures of an internal fiscal nature,181 freeing from
restrictions payments for goods traded under the agreement,182 provi-
sions relating to the adoption of anti-dumping measures, 83 as well as
a prohibition against measures which distort competition, such as car-
tels, exploitation of a dominant position, and public aid.184 This latter
177 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, art. III.
178 Treaty Establishiing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
179 For a comprehensive overview of the Court's case law on these provisions, see W. RAWL.
INSON & M.P. CORNWELL-KELL.Y, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 34-39 (1990).
180 See the affair considered by the European Court of Justice in Case 174/84 Bulk Oil (Zug)
A.G. v. Sun International Ltd., 2 C.M.L.R. 732 (1986).
181 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, art. IX..
182 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, art X. Reference is to foreign currency control regula-
tions, which may not restrict the removal of currency from the State or the purchase of currency
from Israel in connection with the trade in goods to which the agreement applies.
183 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, art. XIV. The article provides that any anti-dumping
measures adopted by any of the parties is to be subject to the restrictive provisions of the Anti-
Dumping Code of GATr7, known as "The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (then, the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code).
This was an innovation, as the State of Israel was not a party to the GATr Anti-Dumping Code
until 1995, upon the coming into force of the Uruguay Round agreement. The above Article,
therefore, required Israel to act in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Code in its relations with
the EC only, even though Israel had not acceded to this code.
184 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, art. XII. See also ERAN LEv, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW&. RELEVANT AsPECiS FOR THE ISRAELi LAWYER AND BusNmSSMAN 195-97 (Hebrew).
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prohibition is also very similar to the provisions set out in the Treaty
of Rome in Articles 85, 86 and 92 respectively, provisions which have
been interpreted broadly and implemented vigorously by the EC in-
stitutions.8 5 This, however, does not mean that the same could be
done with the competition rules of the FIA. The differences in the
institutional setting (there is no equivalent in the FTA to the powerful
institutions of the EC-the Commission and the Court) and in the
objectives of the two regimes (a common market as opposed to a free
trade area) lead to the conclusion that the scope of the rules differ.'86
The agreement also does not contain any reference to the issue of
government procurement and the trade barrier arising out of Buy Na-
tional policies practiced by government agencies in their purchases.
There is also no reference to import licence requirements (which at
the time were common in Israel),187 trade in services or intellectual
property, or to trade related investment measures (such as
TRIMS). 18 All of these provisions may be found in "second genera-
tion" and later FTA agreements, as will be seen below.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Protocol on Rules of
Origin that apply to trade under the agreement contains a number of
hidden traps, which in effect are disguised trade barriers. 8 9 Refer-
ence is made to Protocol No. 3, as amended in 1976.190 Protocol No.
3 determines which products shall be deemed to be products originat-
ing in Israel or in the EC, respectively and, thus, will be entitled to
duty-free treatment and to the other benefits of the agreement. The
purpose of the rules is to prevent the situation where a third State will
take a free-ride on the FTA by exporting its products to the EC
through the State of Israel, or vice-versa, in order to avoid custom
185 See generally RicHARD WeHIt, COMPETITON LAW (2d ed. 1989); BELLAMY & CHILD,
COMMON MARkET LAW OF COMPE=nON (4th ed. 1993).
186 Lev also takes this view. LEv, supra note 184, at 196, as does BELLAMY & CMLD, supra
note 185, at 135. Upon signing the FTA, the EC declared that when applying Article 12 of the
1975 Agreement it would apply the laws relating to Articles 85, 86, 90 and 92 of the Treaty of
Rome, but this was a unilateral declaration to which the State of Israel was not a party. See 1975
Agreement, supra note 173, at 243 (declaration of the EC attached to the agreement).
187 This licensing was carried out under the Import and Export Ordinance (New Version) -
1979, Laws of the State of Israel (New Version) 32 (1979) p. 625, and the various orders promul-
gated thereunder. See EiNHoRN, supra note 173, at 52-57.
188 WTO Agreement, supra note 42, Annex 1A:14.
189 On Rules of Origin in international trade generally and on the use of them to create
concealed trade barriers, see RuLEs OF OIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A CoMPARATvE
STUDY (Vermulst et al. eds., 1994).
190 Decision No. 2/76 of the Joint Committee amending Protocol No. 3 of the agreement
between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel regarding Rules of Origin,
Treaties of the State of Israel 28, 57; O.J. EuR. ComM. (No. L. 190) (1977).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:775 (1996-97)
duties; this is indeed a legitimate goal. It should be recalled that inter-
national trade is based on the principle of reciprocity, and States
which have not given "consideration" cannot enjoy the benefits con-
ferred within the framework of a reciprocal agreement between other
States. Accordingly, to be eligible for the benefits of the FTA, a prod-
uct must either wholly originate within the territory of one of the par-
ties or be a product manufactured from other components which do
not fall into the above category but in the making of which sufficient
work or processing has taken place.
In this regard, Protocol No. 3 provides for the change-of-tariff-
classification-test for determining the origin of a product in that only a
product exported to the EC under a tariff classification different from
the classification of all its components will be recognized as an Israeli
product.191 However, this rule is subject to numerous exceptions
where other conditions may apply.192 Many of these exceptions im-
pose very strict requirements so that many products exported from
Israel are unable to enjoy the duty-free treatment under the agree-
ment. Thus, for example, in the area of textiles, there is a requirement
for TWO tariff classification changes, and not just one. For example,
ties and other clothing designed and sewn in Israel from cloth made
outside Israel are not deemed to be products originating in Israel un-
less the cloth too is made there.193 Further, a synthetic fabric manufac-
tured in Israel will not be deemed to be an Israeli product unless the
thread used to make it also originates in Israel.' 94 There is no doubt
that these and other exceptions were created in order to make it more
difficult to import products from the other party and to protect local
industry.
191 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, art. III, Protocol 3, sect. l(a).
192 Pursuant to Article 3, section 1 of the 1975 Agreement, the exceptions are set out in "List
A" and "List B" in Annexes II and III, respectively, of Protocol 3. In practice, most of Israel's
exports fall within these exceptions and not within the rule. 1975 Agreement, supra note 173,
art. III, sect. 1.
193 See, e.g., 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, List A in Annex II of Protocol 3, Item 61.07; see
generally id. Items 60-62.
194 Id. Item 51.04. It is necessary that the fabric be manufactured from chemical products or
textile pulp, i.e., not just threads.
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This is also true of the general prohibition on draw-backs' 95
found in the amended Protocol No. 3.196 Under amended Protocol
No. 3, a product manufactured in Israel from raw materials imported
from third countries (apart from the EC) and thereafter exported to
the EC would not be entitled to a return of the customs duties paid on
the raw materials at the time of importation. As a result, its price
would rise and it would be more difficult for the product to compete
in the European market. The aforementioned provisions, i.e., the
strict rules of origin and the prohibition on draw-backs, in practice
created hidden trade barriers within the free trade area and thereby
limited the effectiveness of the agreement. Indeed, the rules apply to
both parties, but it is clear that - small country, such as Israel, which is
highly dependent on imported raw materials, will find it more difficult
to meet the strict requirements. This has been reflected in Israel's
trade deficit with the EC which has soared in the last decade.
197
b. Institutional Deficiencies
The legal deficiency of the 1975 Free Trade agreement becomes
even more apparent at the institutional-procedural level. The agree-
ment, in fact, lacks any legal mechanism for dispute settlement be-
195 A draw-back is a return or conditional exemption from duties payable on imports of raw
materials used for the manufacture of products destined for export. This matter is regulated in
Articles 160-162C of Israel's Customs Ordinance (New Version) LSI 1957, p. 39. In the United
States, it is regulated in 19 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1994). See also United States v. International Paint
Co., 35 C.C.P.A. 87, 90 (1948) (stating that the underlying goal of the U.S. drawback regulations
is to deyelop and assist U.S. exports).
196 Article 30 of the amended Protocol No. 3 provides: "Save where decided otherwise by the
joint committee, the products referred to in Article 1 of Protocols Nos. 1 and 2, used for manu-
facture, which do not originate in the EC or Israel, may not be the subject of a return of customs
duties or enjoy any exemption from customs whatsoever, commencing on 1 January 1984." This
provision applies both to customs duties and charges equivalent to customs duties. In note 7 to
this Article (Annex 1 - Explanatory Notes) it is clarified that the prohibition applies "to every
provision for the full or partial return or non-collection of customs duties applicable to products
used for manufacture, on condition that the aforesaid provision grants, expressly or retroac-
tively, for this return or non-collection, where the goods manufactured from the said products
are exported but not where they are destined for national consumption." The prohibition on
draw-backs in relation to exports to the EC is implemented in Israel by Article 4(b) of the
Customs (Draw-Backs on Goods used to Manufacture Products for Export) Order - 1968, Regu-
lations - 1969, p. 514, as amended.
197 Whereas in 1975 the trade deficit with the EC stood at US$784 million, in 1994 it stood at
5,300 million U.S. dollars (according to the figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics). This is
not the place to analyze the significance of these figures, but it would appear that the harsh rules
of origin contributed to this result. For a comprehensive analysis of the effect of the agreement
on Israeli industry, see B. Toren, The Impact of the FTA with the EEC on Israeli Industry: A
Follow-up, in EuRoPE AND IsRAELu TROUBLED NEIGruouas 113 (Greilsammer & J.H.H. Weiler
eds., 1988).
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tween the two parties or for giving binding interpretations in relation
to the provisions of the agreement. The agreement did establish a
Joint Committee (which later changed its name to the "Co-operation
Council"), 198 whose function was to carry out the agreement "and en-
sure its proper implementation."'199 However, this was a parity com-
mittee which comprised an equal number of representatives from the
EC and Israel and whose decisions were made by mutual agreement
only.2 °° It was, therefore, not possible to bring a dispute or contro-
versy regarding the agreement to an objective independent inquiry.
Instead, the agreement adopted the diplomatic model, which, at the
time, was common to most trade agreements. A party which believed
that the other party had violated the agreement could bring his com-
plaint before the committee through diplomatic channels and attempt
to persuade the opposing party of the merits of his claims. He could
also threaten unilateral countermeasures. Enforcement of the agree-
ment was built primarily on self-help by means of protective or ag-
gressive retaliation. The agreement only required that, prior to these
measures being taken, notice be given to the Joint Committee, some-
times with a cooling-down period, in order to enable the committee to
attempt to resolve the dispute peacefully.201 Where no such resolution
was achieved, the injured party became entitled to activate such "pro-
tective measures" as appeared to be necessary, including withdrawal
of tariff concessions.
20 2
There is, of course, a lack of symmetry in the level of effective-
ness of a threat to take such measures when it comes from a small
country and is directed against a powerful body such as the EC, com-
pared to the opposite situation, and there is no doubt that this state of
affairs gives an advantage to the stronger party.
20 3
198 Additional Protocol to the 1975 Agreement, Sept. 26, 1978, Isr.-E.E.C., Art. 9, 21 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L. 270) 4 (1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
199 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, art. 19:1.
200 Id. art. 20.
201 See id. art. 16. This article provides consultation and hearing procedures in relation to
parties' complaints of violations of competition laws (Article 12), increases of imports of specific
products in consequence of changes in customs policy of the other side (Article 13 - equalizing
charge), imports by dumping (Article 14), and serious interferences in the economy of specific
sectors or areas in consequence of the operation of the agreement (Article 15 - safety measures).
In all the cases there is a duty of prior consultation with the committee, unless exceptional cir-
cumstances require immediate interference (Article 16:3 (D)). Id. art. 16(3)(d).
202 See, e.g., id. art. 16(3)(C) (referring to the violation of Article 12). See also id. arts. 12-15.
But see id. art. 16(2) ("In the selection of measures, priority must be given to those which least
disturb the functioning of the Agreement.").
203 See, for example, the dispute between Holland and the United States in the 1950s, Pes-
catore, supra note 98, where Holland waived in advance the imposition of sanctions against the
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The next milestone in the history of trade relations between
Israel and the EC was the Association Agreement of 1995. However,
since this agreement belongs to the "third generation" of FTA agree-
ments, consideration will first be given to "second generation" agree-
ments. Later, we will return to the Association Agreement of 1995.
B. Israel's Trade Relations with the United States
1. Background to the Signing of the 1985 FTA Agreement
About a decade after the signing of the FTA agreement with the
EC, the State of Israel signed its second FTA agreement, this time
with the United States.2° The decision to negotiate this agreement
was reached in November 1983 by President Reagan and Prime Minis-
ter Shamir. Israel wished to ensure free access to its second most im-
portant export market on a more secure basis than the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) which had previously applied. The foun-
dations of the GSP had been laid in the GATI2 °5 and were aimed at
aiding developing countries by a unilateral grant of concessions and
tariff exemptions on goods imported to the wealthy countries. 206 Is-
raeli exports had enjoyed the benefit of this program for many years.
However, Israel feared that export growth would result in forfeiture
of its rights and, eventually, loss of its status as a "developing country"
in the eyes of the U.S. government.0 7
On the other hand, for the first time in its history, the serious
problems encountered in the opening of the Uruguay Round caused
the United States to consider an alternative to the multilateral ap-
proach embodied in GATT (of which the United States had been the
main patron). There were some who hoped that the threat of a bilat-
eral alternative and, in particular, the possibility of establishing a re-
gional trading bloc with Canada, would spur negotiations within
United States, despite being authorized to impose them by the GATT Council. One may assume
that this incident also contributed to Holland's decision to join the EC, which gives its members
an organizational framework possessing greater power in the arena of world trade.
204 Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, Isr.-U.S., 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985) [hereinafter 1985
Agreement].
205 See GATI', supra note 36, art. 34.
206 See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1461-65, for the program that was implemented by the
United States.
207 On the background to this agreement, see generally Dennis James Jr., The Agreement on
Establishment of a Free Trade Area Between the Government of the United States and the Govern-
ment oflsrael, in THE LEGAL FRAMEwoRK FOR CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE 121-27 (Mau-
reen Irish & Emily F. Carasco eds., 1987); Susan A. Baldwin, Recent Developments:
International Trade, 27 HARv. L.J. 289 (1986); Sandra Ward, Note, The U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Area; Is it GATT Legal?, 19 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 199 (1985).
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GATT. The FTA agreement with Israel was expected to easily obtain
the necessary confirmation in the U.S. Congress where Israel tradi-
tionally enjoyed support. Finally, the United States was interested in
equating the status of its exports to Israel with that of European ex-
ports. As noted previously, the latter were due to obtain a full exemp-
tion- from customs duties as a result of the FTA agreement with the
EC. From the vantage point of the U.S. government, therefore, the
agreement with the small and popular State of Israel was regarded as
a convenient "experiment" in terms of a first-time FTA agreement.
The success of the experiment and the signing of the agreement in the
beginning of 1985 allowed the United States to immediately turn its
attention to what it regarded as the more significant project-engag-
ing in an FTA agreement with Canada. Such an agreement was signed
two years later.2
0 8
2. "Second Generation" ETA Agreements: Substantive Provisions
The FTA agreement with the United States may be defined as a
"second generation" FTA agreement, both in substantive terms and at
an institutional-procedural level. Like its predecessor, its primary
achievement was the elimination of tariffs on the trade between the
two countries, a process which was effected over a period of ten years.
In contrast to the agreement with the EC, however, under the U.S.
FTA agreement, the process was carried out on a reciprocal basis in
both countries.20 9 Moreover, unlike the EC agreement, the FTA with
the United States applies to agricultural products and requires the
elimination of all protective tariffs on agricultural goods. Only import
restrictions which do not take the form of customs duties, such as
quantitative restrictions and special charges, may be imposed by the
parties on the basis of agricultural policy considerations.210 The agree-
ment does not contain a prohibition on customs duty draw-backs, like
that which exists in the agreement with the EC. Similarly, the rules of
origin in the agreement are not subjected to countless exceptions tai-
lored to meet the protectionist needs of local industry.21' Further, un-
208 The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
209 See 1985 Agreement, supra note 204, art. 2, at 658. The products were divided into groups,
each of which was subject to a different timetable for tariff eliminations. See id. Annex 2, at 668-
69. The Final elimination was carried out on January 1, 1995. See id. at 669.
210 Id. art. 6. Both Israel and the United States have made use of this authorization and have
imposed import quotas on a number of agricultural products. U.S., Israel Agree to Negotiate
Greater Access for Farm Products, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1783 (Oct. 25, 1995).
211 The rules of origin of the 1985 Agreement are set out in Annex Three of the agreement.
See 1985 Agreement, supra note 204, Annex 3, at 669-73. These rules are not based on the
change of customs classification criteria, but on the "substantial transformation" test, together
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like its predecessor, the agreement prohibits quantitative restrictions
on exports and applies the general prohibition on new restrictions,
such as customs duties, equivalent charges, quantitative restrictions
and measures having equivalent effect, on both imports and
exports.212
The regulation of NTBs under the Israel-U.S. FTA is, therefore,
more highly developed than under the 1975 agreement with the EC.
Apart from the general prohibition referred to above, the U.S. agree-
ment contains an article prohibiting each party from making imports
from the other conditional upon obtaining an import licence. This pro-
hibition is subject to only two exceptions: (1) where the licence is
automatically approved (such licenses are generally issued for statisti-
cal purposes), or (2) where the licence is necessary in order to admin-
ister a quantitative ceiling on imports justified under the FTA or
under GATT.2 13 The issue of export subsidies is also comprehensively
regulated by the agreement. Indeed, upon the request of the United
States, Israel undertook in Annex Four of the FTA to accede to the
Subsidies Code of GAIT. 214 This Code, which was developed during
the Tokyo Round,215 prohibits the grant of export subsidies with re-
spect to all industrial products. The FTA agreement also contains pro-
visions requiring liberalization in government procurements, 216 as well
as an undertaking to protect intellectual property rights.217 In addi-
tion, there is a prohibition on the imposition of trade-related perform-
ance requirements as a condition for the authorization of investments
with a demand for added value of 35%. As mentioned previously, there are no exceptions to
this general rule, and accordingly there is no room for special requirements designed to prevent
or make it more difficult to engage in imports from the other side in "sensitive" sectors. For an
extensive discussion of these rules of origin, see Allan S. Galper, Note, Restructuring Rules of
Origin in the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement: Does the EC-Israel Association Agreement Offer
an Effective Model?, 19 FoDHNsi INT'L L. J. 2028, 2065-67 (1996).
212 1985 Agreement, supra note 204, art. 4, at 658; Cf. 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, arts.
3-4.
213 1985 Agreement, supra note 204, art. 12, at 661.
214 See id. Annex 4, at 663. Israel also undertook not to institute any new export subsidy
programs and not to increase the level of subsidization in existing programs above the level
prevailing on November 7, 1984. Id. at 673-74. Similarly, Israel undertook to eliminate the sub-
sidy elements from all its export assistance programs. Id.
215 See WTO Agreement, supra note 42, Annex IA(6), at 29.
216 1985 Trade Agreement, supra note 204, art. 15, at 662-63. For an extensive discussion of
this provision, see Arie Reich, Toward Free Trade in the Public Sector A Comparative Study of
International Agreements on Government Procurement 365-75 (Doctoral Thesis, University of
Toronto, 1994) (unpublished and on file with the University of Toronto library).
217 1985 Agreement, supra note 204, art. 14, at 662.
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by nationals of the other party.218 This provision is in the nature of a
preliminary and more limited version of the TRIMs agreement, signed
a decade later within the framework of the Uruguay Round.219
A further important innovation of the FIA of 1985, which too
foreshadowed the Uruguay Round, may be seen in the provisions re-
lating to trade in services. In Article 16, the parties proclaim their rec-
ognition of the importance of trade in services and the need to
maintain an open system of services exports which would minimize
restrictions on the flow of services between the two nations. Appar-
ently, the novelty of this concept led to the provision, being formu-
lated as "soft law," within the framework of a joint declaration
annexed to the agreement. The declaration refers to the need to liber-
alize this area on the basis of three principles: (1) the establishment of
a free market for the service industries of both parties; (2) treatment
of the service industries of the other party not less favorable than that
afforded local firms; and (3) open and accessible information about
laws and regulations concerning services.
2 0
3. The Supervisory and Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The supervisory and dispute settlement mechanism contained in
the 1985 agreement provides further evidence of the greater degree of
sophistication of this agreement. The agreement sets up a Joint Com-
mittee whose function is to "supervise the proper implementation of
the agreement and review the trade relationship between the Par-
ties."221 The functions and powers of the Committee are expansively
defined, and each party is entitled to demand the convening of the
Committee upon giving twenty-one days' notice. The agreement re-
quires each party to give the other party prior written notice before
218 Id. art. 13, at 662. The article prohibits each side from imposing, as a condition for estab-
lishing, expanding or maintaining investments by nationals or companies of the other party, re-
quirements to export any amount of production resulting from such investments or to purchase
locally-produced goods and services. Id. Moreover, it prohibits the imposition of requirements
on investors to, purchase locally-produced goods and services as a condition for receiving any
type of governmental incentive. It should be noted that export requirements are prohibited
solely when they are made a condition to the "establishment, expansion or maintenance of in-
vestments," but not when they are imposed as a condition to obtaining government incentives.
Id. This conclusion arises out of the comparison between the first sentence and the second sen-
tence of the article. It follows that export requirements which occasionally are involved in the
award of the status of an "authorized plant" under the 1959 Encouragement of Capital Invest-
ments Law, are not prohibited under this agreement. Nevertheless, there is place to examine
their legality under the new TRIMs agreement.
219 WTO Agreement, supra note 42, Annex IA, at 29
220 See James, supra note 207, at 126.
221 1985 Trade Agreement, supra note 204, art. 17(1), at 663.
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taking any trade measures with respect to products traded between
the two nations. Such notice gives a party affected by these measures
a suitable opportunity for consultation.' The dispute settlement
mechanism of the agreement is set out in Article Nineteen. The
grounds for invoking the mechanism are similar to those found in Ar-
ticle XXIV of GATT and include not only an allegation that the
agreement (including the Subsidies Code) has been violated,223 but
also a claim that a party considers that "measures taken by the other
party severely.., distort the balance of trade benefits accorded by [the
agreement] or substantially undermine fundamental objectives of [the
agreement]. 224 The agreement provides for the following procedural
stages. First, when a dispute arises, the parties shall make every at-
tempt to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution through consulta-
tion.225 If this is unsuccessful, either party may then refer the matter
to the Joint Committee, which will be convened and will endeavor to
resolve the dispute.226 In the event that the dispute is not resolved by
the Committee within a period of sixty days, then either party may
refer the matter to a conciliation panel. The conciliation panel is to be
composed of three members.22 7 The primary task of this panel is to
effect a compromise between the parties and to reach an agreed reso-
lution of the dispute. However, if the panel fails to effect a compro-
mise, then the panel will be transformed into an arbitration panel
whose function is to hear the claims of the parties and their evidence
and to make factual and legal determinations regarding the dispute
before it.2  Similarly, the panel must draft a "proposal" for the settle-
222 Id. art. 18, at 664.
223 However, the mechanism may not be invoked in respect of the unilateral imposition of
anti-dumping or counterveiling duties. Id. art. 19(1)(A), at 664-651.
-224 Id. There is room to discuss the relationship between this formula and the formula set out
in Article XXIV of GATr, which refers on "nullification or impairment of benefits". Prima
facie, Article 19 is more limited, in that it requires a "serious" distortion of the balance of trade
advantages between the two countries. This therefore implies a narrowing of the non-legal
grounds of GATr 1947, a change which is compatible with the juridicization process under dis-
cussion here.
225 Id. art. 19(1)(b), at 665.
226 Id. art. 19(1)(c), at 665.
227 Id. art. 19(1)(d), at 665. Under this system, the State of Israel will usually appoint an
Israeli citizen as an arbitrator on its behalf; the United States will likewise appoint an American
citizen as anarbitrator on its behalf. The two arbitrators will jointly appoint a neutral third arbi-
trator, who is a citizen of a third country. This is what occurred in the Sharnoa arbitration. See
infra note 230 and accompanying text.
228 1985 Agreement, supra note 204, art. 19(1)(E), AT 665. See also Avraham Azrieli, Im-
proving Arbitration Under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement: A Framework for a Middle-East
Free Trade Zone, 67 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 187, 227 (1993).
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ment of the dispute. However, the agreement expressly provides that
"[t]he report of the panel shall be non-binding.
22 9
This dispute settlement mechanism was successfully invoked by
Israel in the "Sharnoa" affair. In that case, Israel complained that
products of an Israeli plant (Sharnoa), which were recognized as fulfil-
ling the rules of origin requirements of the FTA, were being counted
by the U.S. authorities within the export quotas of Taiwan. As a re-
suit, the Taiwanese suppliers of Sharnoa's components stopped sup-
plies to the Israeli company, and Israel was left without a' source for
these components. The Taiwanese suppliers preferred to export the
full quota of completed products to the United States, rather than ex-
port components to the plant in Israel. Following Sharnoa's complaint
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the State of Israel commenced
consultations with the United States to resolve the problem. When the
consultations did not succeed, the dispute was referred to the concilia-
tion/arbitration panel. 30 Following a hearing, the panel held, in a
well-reasoned opinion extending over forty pages,231 that the United
States had violated the agreement by "counting" the Israeli exports
within the Taiwanese quota. The decisive for the panel was the con-
clusion that the United States' action, in effect, imposed a restriction
on Israeli exports to the United States,23 2 without one of the qualifica-
tions set out in the agreement permitting it to do so. The panel held
that the United States was required to stop designating the Israeli
229 1985 Trade Agreement, supra note 204, art. 19(l)(e), at 665.
230 The State of Israel appointed Professor Joseph H. Weiler of the University of Michigan, an
expert in E.C. and international trade law, as its arbitrator. The United States appointed Profes-
sor Greenwald, a previous U.S. Ambassador to the E.C. institutions, as its arbitrator. These two
persons chose Professor Donald MacCrea of Canada, the Dean of the Law School in Ottawa, as
the chairman of the arbitration panel. The arbitration took place in Washington in the beginning
of 1991. From discussions with officials involved in the process. See also Azrieli, supra note 228,
at 206.
231 To date, the arbitration award has till not been formally published because of the strict
refusal of the United States to permit publication. This author's application to the U.S. authori-
ties in this regard met with no response. The contents of the award may be read in a variety of
newspaper articles and in the press notice of June 17, 1991, published by the legal advisor to the
Israeli Ministry of Trade and Industry. See Arbitration Panel says U.S. violated Israel FTA in
Attempt to Block Taiwan Machine Tools, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (July 17, 1991).
232 The panel inferred that the United States had violated the provision in Article Four which
refers to "equivalent measures" (that is, measures having the equivalent effect to that of quanti-
tative restrictions). This article was apparently interpreted by testing its result, that is, whether
the United States was violating that agreement if it did not impose any direct restriction on
Israeli products, but the practical result of its actions was that importation of the Israeli products
into the United States was nevertheless prevented. This interpretation conforms to the interpre-
tation given by the EC Court to the parallel provision in the Rome Treaty. See Procureur du Roi
v. Dassonville (1974) ECR 837; [1974] 2 CMLR 436 (E.C.). Since two of the arbitrators were
professors of EC law, the similarity in the two interpretations was probably not a coincidence.
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product as a Taiwanese product and recommended that the parties
consider a compromise solution. Following the panel's decision, a
compromise was reached which was satisfactory to Israel.
Therefore, this is a dispute settlement mechanism which is more
developed from a legal point of view than the mechanism (or more
accurately, the non-existent mechanism) in the 1975 FTA agreement.
However, it is less developed than the 1994 binding mechanism of the
WTO. In fact, the Israel-U.S. mechanism resembles the system ex-
isting at the time in GATT disputes, as reflected in the understanding
on dispute settlement drafted durin.g the Tokyo Round in 1979.11 Not
only are the grounds of complaint similar, but both agreements grant
the right to refer the dispute to an independent panel of arbitrators
and obtain a legal and factual determination with a practical recom-
mendation for a solution. In both agreements, this determination is
only a recommendation which, in order for it to be binding, requires
the agreement of the parties themselves.234 One cannot assume that
this similarity is coincidental. It is likely that it reflects certain ac-
cepted concepts with regard to the manner of settlement of trade dis-
putes between sovereign states - concepts which express the level of
development of international trade law at the relevant time. The pure
diplomatic model has long been abandoned, but the pure legal model
has not yet been achieved. The result is a diplomatic-legal hybrid
which characterizes a transition period in the development of the in-
ternational legal system
C. Third Generation FFA Agreements
The 1990's have seen the establishment of third generation FTA
agreements. The juridicization process of trade relations is also ex-
pressed in the bilateral free trade agreements which the State of Israel
233 Understanding Regarding Dispute Settlement, supra note 91.
234 While GATT did not expressly state that the determination was not binding, that was the
practical effect of the custom; the GATT panel's recommendation was ultimately not adopted.
In one respect, the mechanism of the 1985 Agreement was preferable to that of GATT. That is
because the FTA Agreement allowed the complaintant state to convene the conciliation/arbitra-
tion panel and submit to it its entire complaint. In contrast, under GAIT, it was necessary to
obtain the unanimous consent of the Council in order to convene a panel and draft its terms of
reference. Thus, it was possible that an interested party could block the proceedings altogether
under the terms of GATr. See GATT, supra note 36, pt. B, sect. 3.1. However, in other re-
spects, the GATr mechanism was more sophisticated and better developed than the FTA
Agreement. For example, the GAIT mechanism contained hearing regulations and it required
that all the members of the panel be independent (that is, they could not be a national of the
state which was involved in the dispute), and experts in the field of international trade relations.
See Understanding Regarding Dispute Settlement, supra note 91. There are no such provisions
in the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
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signed during the middle of this decade.2 35 The most prominent ex-
ample of this is the new agreement between Israel and the EC, known
as the Association Agreement, which was signed on November 20,
1995.236
1. The Association Agreement of 1995 Between Israel and the EC
For many years, the State of Israel wished to revise the trade
agreement of 1975, some of the flaws of which have been described
above. However, frosty political relations between Israel and the EC
prevented this from occurring. Israel's trade deficit with the EC grew,
and it was feared that the situation would deteriorate even further
with the enlargement of the EC, the establishment of the European
Economic Area with the EFTA States and the strengthening of ties
with the countries of Eastern Europe. The changes anticipated from
the Uruguay Round of GATT also necessitated a revision and recon-
sideration of the agreement. Bilateral relations only started warming
up after the Middle East peace process strengthened with the Europe-
235 It should be noted that in 1992, the State of Israel signed its third FrA agreement, this
time with EFTA. The agreement came into force on January 1, 1993. See EFTA Agrees Free
Trade Accord with Israel, REUTER NEWS SERVICE, July 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News File. The members of EFTA at the time were: Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Iceland, Finland and Lichtenstein. The principal reason for signing this agreement was the
establishment of the "European Economic Area" between EFTA states and the EC, which inter
alia unified tariffs between the two entities. Accordingly, it was necessary to harmonize the rela-
tions between Israel and the EFTA States on one hand, and the relations between Israel and the
EC on the other. In this agreement there are many provisions which are more sophisticated than
those contained in the 1975 agreement with the EC, such as the provisions concerning govern-
ment procurements, protection of intellectual property rights, a declaration on trade in services
and more. However, the potential of these provisions has never been realized, as a short time
after this agreement came into force, four of the EFTA states gave notice that they wished to
join the EC. Three of them (Sweden, Austria and Finland) have since done so, so that the impor-
tance of the agreement has been greatly reduced.
236 The Euro'-Mediterannean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part
(unpublished) [hereinafter Association Agreement]. At the time of writing, this agreement has
not yet been ratified, and accordingly has also not yet been published in the official gazette.
However, as the ratification process is expected to be a lengthy one, and in order to obtain
immediate implementation of the provisions of the agreement relating to free trade, the parties
have signed an Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade Related Matters, which came into force
on January 1, 1996. The interim agreement contains, in the main, all the provisions of the Associ-
ation Agreement relating to the movement of goods, free competition, property rights, customs,
the Joint Committee, dispute settlement, annexes and protocols relating to agricultural products,
rules of origin and co-operations in customs matters. On the Association Agreement, see
Galper, supra note 211, at 2084-91; Moshe Hirsh, The 1995 Agreement Between the European
Communities and Israek Three Unresolved Issues, 1 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 87 (1996).
This article considers the Association Agreement only, on the assumption that the ratifica-
tion process will shortly be completed, and the agreement will thereafter become fully effective.
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ans displaying a willingness not only to update the agreement but also
to create a completely new international regime. 37 In December
1993, the Council of the European Union authorized the commence-
ment of negotiations, and, after almost two years, the agreement was
signed.23 8 This agreement is part of the "Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship" program, within which the EC intends to sign association agree-
ments with many Mediterranean countries.2 3 9
a. Substantive Provisions of the Agreement
The new agreement creates a comprehensive and inclusive re-
gime with respect to most areas of international trade and even to
many areas which are outside the field of trade. The agreement be-
longs to the type of associations agreements which are designed to
create a close economic relationship between the EC and third coun-
tries, a relationship which goes beyond the relations created by ordi-
nary FTAs, but which of course falls short of full membership in the
EC.
240
The agreement reinforces the FTA which was established be-
tween the parties in 1975.241 The implicit permission found in the old
FTA to impose quantitative restrictions on exports are annulled by
the new agreement. Thus, all quantitative restrictions or measures
having equivalent effect, whether on imports or exports, are prohib-
ited.242 Important amendments have also been made regarding rules
of origin,243 although not all of the changes desired by Israel have
237 Galper, supra note 211, at 2088-91.
238 Association Agreement, supra note 236.
239 Agreements similar to that signed by Israel and the EC have also been signed with Mo-
rocco and Tunisia. Negotiations are underway with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon and are also
expected with Algeria; preliminary talks are being conducted with Syria. Galper, supra note 211,
nn.371-72.
240 On the foreign relations of the EC, see LEv, supra note 184, at 183-91.
241 Association Agreement, supra note 236, art. 6.
242 Id. arts. 16-17.
243 See id. Protocol No. 4 to the Agreement. TWo types of changes have been made: (a)
Changes necessitated by technological advances since the signing of the previous agreement;
thus, in the area of electronics and chemistry alternative rules of origin have been established
which are based on the principle of a high added value (generally 75%), without reference to
changes in the classification of the tariff; and (b) Changes which allow greater flexibility in the
implementation of the rules; first, there is a general flexibility of 10%, under which an exception
to the rule is permitted of up to 10% of the value of the exported product. Thus, for example, a
product which, according to the rules, must be a product made solely out of local raw materials,
may contain up to 10% imported raw materials. Second, there is territorial flexibility of up to
10% of the value of the product, in terms of which it is possible to process original local materi-
als in another country which is not a party to the agreement, on condition that the value of the
processing does not exceed 10% of the value of the finished product, and that the product is
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been introduced. 44 The FTA has not yet been extended to agricul-
tural products, and, in that sector, many restrictions continue to ap-
ply.245 Nevertheless, the parties have agreed to gradually implement
greater liberalization of their trade in agricultural products.246
The agreement also contains more sophisticated provisions with
regard to non-tariff barriers. These provisions concern important is-
sues, such as dumping,247 public procurement,248 standards,249 subsi-
dies and competition law.1 0 In addition, the agreement reflects a
returned to the local manufacturer before export. (The export must in any event be carried out
directly between Israel and the European Union). The above two flexibilities do not apply to
textile products and clothing. It is also important to note that large exporters ("authorized ex-
porters") may be exempt from filing certificates of origin - EUR 1, before receiving the benefits
of the agreement; this is a significant administrative improvement. See id. art. 23, Protocol No. 4.
244 Israel has still not received a positive response to its request to receive accumulation rights
with other countries in Europe, which are not members of the Union. Thus, Israeli components
in finished products which are, for example, exported from Switzerland to the EU, will not en-
able the Swiss manufacturer to benefit from the duty-free treatment to which he would have
been entitled had the components been manufactured in Switzerland. This is despite the fact that
both Israel and Switzerland have a free trade agreement with the EC. Accordingly, the Swiss
manufacturer will prefer to use components manufactured in the EU and not in Israel. Israel's
request for cumulative recognition with Arab countries, so as to enable industrial co-operation
to the benefit of the peace process, has also not been accepted. Further, the prohibition on
customs drawbacks on exports has not been eliminated. See id. art. 16, Protocol No. 4.
245 For details, see id. arts. 10-15 of the Association Agreement. See also id. art. 9 (permitting
the maintenance of charges on the agricultural component of industrial products).
246 Id. art. 11. From January 1, 2000, the parties will review the situation in order to deter-
mine the measures which the EC and Israel will apply as of January 1, 2001, in accordance with
this objective.
247 See id. arts. 22, 25:3. These provisions make the anti-dumping procedures subject to the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code, but also require that bilateral consultations are conducted concur-
rently with internal legal proceedings, with the aim of reaching an agreed resolution to the
problem.
248 See id. art. 35 which refers to taking measures with a view to a mutual opening of the
parties' respective government procurement markets beyond what is required by GATT. This
was done after a short period, and two supplementary agreements have been reached in this
area, which inter alia refer to the important telecommunications sector. The equipment of public
plants in this sector (such as Bezeq) will no longer be subject to internal regulations giving pref-
erence to local products, where Israeli and EC suppliers respectively are concerned. See Propo-
sal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of two Agreements between the European
Communities and the State of Israel on Procurement by Government and Telecommunications
Operations, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C162) 10 (1996).
249 Association Agreement, supra note 236, art. 47. This article sets the goal of reducing dif-
ferences in standardization and conformity assessment. For this purpose the parties shall con-
clude agreements relating to mutual recognition in the field of conformity assessment, so that
standards institutes in all the State parties will be authorized to confirm the conformity to stan-
dards of the other country. Negotiations on this issue have already begun.
250 Id. arts. 36-38. In addition to the general provisions taken from Articles 85-86 and Article
92 of the Treaty of Rome (and which were also contained in the old agreement), the Association
Agreement provides that the Association Council shall adopt detailed rules for the implementa-
tion of these provisions, within 3 years of the agreement coming into force. Such rules are ex-
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trend which is characteristic of trade agreements of the 1990's,
namely, it touches upon economic areas which are outside the field of
traditional trade. Thus, for example, the agreement contains provi-
sions relating to the right of firms of one side to establish themselves
in the territory of the other. The agreement also liberalizes the provi-
sion of services. 5 There are provisions which are intended to guar-
antee free movement of capital and payments,252 as well as protect
intellectual property rights.25 3 The parties have also agreed to in-
crease cooperation in the area of science and technology.254 Within
the framework of this cooperation, Israel, for the first time, has been
allowed to join "the Fourth Framework Program for Research and
Technological Development" of the EU. This program is intended to
raise the standard of knowledge and the competitive power of indus-
try on the international level by financing development projects and
scientific, technological and practical research. The participation of
Israel (in return for a sizeable annual membership fee of about $30
million U.S. dollars) will encourage scientific-technological coopera-
tion between Israeli and European bodies, financed by the program.
The agreement also contains provisions relating to co-operation
between the parties on a broad range of other issues, including indus-
try, agriculture, financial services, protection of the environment, en-
ergy, information infrastructures and telecommunications, transport,
tourism, approximation of laws, drugs and money laundering, migra-
tremely important for the practical implementation of these provisions. with regard to subsidies,
the agreement in the meantime refers to the subsidies agreement of the WTO, discussed above,
as binding in respect of the implementation of the prohibition on subsidies. Similarly, there are
rules relating to monopolies, which require the parties to ensure that by the end of the fifth year
following the entry into force of the agreement, no discrimination regarding the conditions
under which goods are procured and marketed shall exist between nationals of the EC and
Israel, and that there shall be no other measures distorting the trade between the parties to an
extent contrary to the interests of the parties. Id. arts. 37-38.
251 Id. art. 29.
252 Id. arts. 31-32. Free movement of capital is one of the "four basic freedoms" guaranteed in
the European Common Market. It is anchored in Article 67 of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of
Rome, supra note 178. Now, it is also desired to gradually entrench it within the free trade area
between Israel and the EC. At the same time Article 33 of the agreement contains a
grandfathering provision, under which restrictions which exist on the date of entry into force of
the agreement, in respect of the movement of capital between the parties involving direct invest-
ment, including in real estate, establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission
of securities to capital markets, shall not be prejudiced. In any event, any limitation on repatria-
tion of investments by foreigners is forbidden.
253 Association Agreement, supra note 236, art. 39. According to Annex VII to the agree-
ment, Israel undertakes to accede to a number of multilateral conventions relating to protection
of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights to which the Member States of the EU
are party or which they implement in practice.
254 Id. art. 40.
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tion policy, the audiovisual sector, education and culture.255 There are
also provisions relating to social matters, such as guaranteeing the
rights of workers employed in the other State, and more.256
As a rule, the approach adopted by the agreement in numerous
areas, particularly in the "new" areas, is the establishment of goals
and frameworks for the continued development of the regime. This
approach is similar to that occasionally found in the internal legisla-
tion of States; primary legislation posits the goals, the basic rules and
the authority to promulgate detailed regulations for the achievement
of the goals, while these regulations are later settled by secondary leg-
islators who fill the framework with real content.
b. Supervisory and Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Finally, consideration should be given to the institutional provi-
sions of the agreement, which also reflect the greater sophistication of
this international trade regime. Here, too, it is evident that the regime
bears much resemblance to that found in the multilateral WTO/
GATT agreement of the same period.
The agreement establishes an "Association Council" which shall
meet at the ministerial level at least -once a year.257 In addition, in
order to enable more regular and efficient handling of the numerous
matters covered by the agreement, an "Association Committee" is set
up which shall consist of officials.258 The Committee will have the
power to make decisions for the management of the agreement, as
well as in those areas in which the Association Council has delegated
its powers to it. In both these bodies, decisions can be taken by con-
sensus only.259 However, once the decisions are reached by agree-
ment, they shall be binding on the parties and the parties are
requireded to take the necessary measures to implement the deci-
sions.26° Contrary to the old agreement with the EC, the new agree-
ment enables the referral of a dispute connected to the application or
interpretation of the agreement to arbitration.26' Contrary to the
255 See generally id. arts. 45-61.
256 See id. arts. 63-66.
257 Id. art. 67.
258 Id. arts. 70-71.
259 See id. art. 69:2 (regarding the Association Council); see also id. art. 72:2 (regarding the
Association Committee).
260 Id. arts. 69:1, 72:1.
261 Id. art. 75:4. Such a referral will take place where the Association Council fails to settle
the dispute by agreement. In such a case, each party may notify the other of the appointment of
an arbitrator, the other party must then appoint a second arbitrator within two months (for this
purpose the EC and the Member States are deemed to be one party to the dispute). The Associ-
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agreement with the United States, here, the decisions of the arbitra-
tors (which may be reached by a majority vote) are binding.262
In addition to the resemblance on this last issue with the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism, it is interesting to note similar trends
in the stance toward non-legal grounds of complaint under both re-
gimes. It will be recalled that the 1985 FTA with the United States of
1985 recognized grounds for a complaint arising otherwise than by vir-
tue of a violation,263 as did the GATT agreement of 1949.2 4 In con-
trast, it does not appear that. the new agreement with the EC
recognizes such grounds of action. Rather, the general relief provided
by arbitration and the imposition of sanctions is limited solely to cases
of violation of the provisions of the agreement.265 This development is
consistent with the process of juridicization considered in relation to
GATT, and in particular the Uruguay Round, which significantly re-
stricted the use of non-legal grounds of action.266 One must, however,
note one significant shortcoming in the new dispute settlement mecha-
nism of the Association Agreement, and that is the absence of an ex-
clusivity and primacy clause, similar to the provision found in the
WTO.2 67 The referral of a dispute to the Association Council is a
right, not an obligation,268 and the agreement does not seem to pro-
ation Council will appoint a third arbitrator. Here there is a certain flaw in the procedural provi-
sions relating to the establishment of the panel of arbitrators, as a defending party may prima
facie suspend his agreement to the appointment of the third arbitrator, or reject every candidate
proposed, and thereby block the proceedings, since every decision of the Association Council
must be unanimous. In view of this, the parties have issued a joint declaration concerning Article
75 to the effect that "the parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Association Council shall
appoint the third arbitrator within 2 months of the appointment of the second arbitrator."
262 Article 75:4 provides: "Each party to the dispute must take the steps required to imple-
ment the decisions of the arbitrators." Id. art. 75:4.
263 Article 19(a) of the 1985 Agreement, supra note 204.
264 See supra note 83, and accompanying text.
265 Article 75 of the agreement provides that it is possible to refer "any dispute relating to the
application or interpretation of this agreement" to the Association Council, and thereafter to
arbitration. Association Agreement, supra note 236, art. 75. There is no reference whatsoever to
"nullification or impairment of benefits", or to a "serious distortion of the balance of trade
advantages," or "undermining the purposes of the agreement", such as may be found in the
other agreements mentioned. Similarly, Article 79:2, which refers to taking counter measures,
applies only when it appears to one of the parties that the other party "has failed to fulfil an
obligation under the agreement."
266 The ground of "nullification or impairment of benefits" does still exist, but in cases of
"non-violation nullification or impairment of benefits" numerous limitations apply; inter alia,
there is no longer an obligation to order the revocation of the injurious measure. See infra Sect.
C, para. 3.2.7. On the other hand, proof of a violation creates a presumption of "nullification or
impairment of benefits", so that the cumulative result of these changes is a return to the more
legal category of "violation."
267 The DSU, supra note 118, art. 23.
268 The Association Agreement, supra note 236, art. 75:1.
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hibit unilateral action not authorized by arbitrators.269 This may
prove to be a problem in the future.
2. Other Third Generation Trade Agreements
In addition to the new agreement with the EC, the State of Israel
is currently negotiating additional trade agreements. For example, ne-
gotiations have been advanced with Canada27 ° and Turkey, as well as
with several East European countries. In many cases, the drafts of the
agreements have already been finalized, although they have not been
signed or ratified. These agreements, even where they are first-time
agreements between Israel and the above countries, also reflect an
advanced level of substantive and procedural legal sophistication.271
They, therefore, support the existence of a process of juridicization, as
put forth in this article.
Abundant evidence of this process may also be adduced from bi-
lateral and regional trade agreements entered into by other countries,
such as the NAFTA agreement between the United States, Canada
and Mexico,27 2 trade agreements in South America,273 European
agreements, and more.
IV. THE CAUSES OF THE JURIDICIZATION PROCESS
How may this phenomenon be explained? Why have govern-
ments gradually abandoned the flexible, diplomatic model for regulat-
269 On the contrary, art. 79 allows any Party to take "appropriate measures," if it considers
that the other Party has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Agreement. While it is required
to supply the Association Council with all relevant information, in order to enable the Council to
seek an acceptable solution, it is not obliged to wait for such a solution before taking measures.
270 On August 1, 1996, shortly before the completion of this article, a new FTA was signed
between Canada and Israel (not yet published). The FTA has still to be ratified, but is expected
to come into force on January 1997, if all procedures are completed. A brief analysis of the
agreement shows that it fits very well into the thesis of this article. It establishes a broad and
advanced FTA regime in relation to trade in goods, with several innovative and liberalizing
provisions with regard to rules of origin (Tolerance, Fungibility, Minor Processing, and Tranship-
ment - see chapter 3). It incorporates many of the "modem" provisions of the GATT, and in-
cludes provisions on new areas not yet covered by GATT, such as competition policy (chapter
7). Finally, it features a sophisticated and binding dispute settlement mechanism (chapter 8),
based on standards of due process and transparency, which strongly resembles the WTO mecha-
nism in this field.
271 This analysis is based on conversations conducted by the author with senior government
officials involved in the negotiations. As these agreements have still not been completely final-
ized and have not been published, it is not possible to discuss them more fully here.
272 -Compare North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993), with Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 23, 1987, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 293 (1988).
273 See generally Sam Laird, Latin American Trade Liberalization, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
195 (1995).
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ing trade relations in favor of a stricter, legalistic model? Why are we
now witnessing a greater sophistication and expansion of all the inter-
national trade regimes, both on the multilateral and bilateral levels?
There are a number of possible answers to these questions.
A. "Natural" Evolution
It is possible to argue that the States learned from experience and
saw that the flexible model could not guarantee the efficient function-
ing of the trade regimes, and that their economic interests required
the establishment of a distinct and strong regime which could be en-
forced. Indeed, there are legal schools of thought which hold that
norms and legal mechanisms evolve in a manner partially analogous
to natural evolution as propounded by Darwin. 74 The norms and
mechanisms which serve certain social goals best are the ones which
will ultimately be selected and disseminated.
On its own, this approach may, at best, supply a conceptual
framework for considering the phenomenon, but it cannot explain its
causes. Why is the legal model the preferred model for regulating
trade relations in the opinion of the GAT parties? If this is indeed
the case, why did they not evolve fifty years ago?
B. The Functionalist Theory
Similar to the evolutionary approach is the functionalist theory
regarding processes of political integration developed by David Mi-
trany.2 75 According to this theory, modem times have seen the in-
creasing importance of apolitical technical problems, the resolution of
which requires international cooperation between "technicians,"
rather than cooperation between politicians. Mitrany's theory includes
the doctrine of "ramification," according to which the development of
cooperation in one technical area leads to similar conduct in other
technical areas as a result of the need to widen the cooperation and
transfer the successes to additional related areas. So far, this theory
has been implemented primarily in the context of the integration of
274 See LLoYD, supra note 9, at 551-52. The leading proponent of this view was Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903) who believed that natural evolution was the key to understanding social
and legal developments. He regarded this approach as highly scientific, and in his view it justified
an attitude of laissezfaire in all fields of economics as well as severe limitations on governmental
interventionism. Today there is renewed interest in this theory. See e.g., R. Clark, The Interdis-
ciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L. J. 1238 (1981); M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in
Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv. 31 (1993).
275 See generally D. MrrnmA, A WoRXXNG PEACE SYSTEM (1966).
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the EC.276 It explains how the integrated regimes expand outwards
from the pure field of trade toward policy issues relating to invest-
ments, transport, taxation, social policy and monetary policy.
Applying this theory in the context of GATF, it is possible to
explain the substantive element of the juridicization process, i.e., the
phenomenon of the multiplication of norms and the expansion of the
areas regulated within GATT. One may, therefore, argue that, as the
process of reciprocal elimination of tariffs under GATT made pro-
gress and enjoyed successful results, the problem of NTBs as the ma-
jor obstacle to international trade liberalization became more evident.
Likewise, the more successful the regime was in the area of trade in
goods, the greater the need to expand it to trade in services and to
deal with trade distortions originating from the protection of intellec-
tual property rights.277 The next issue of importance, which is akin to
the above matters, is undoubtedly investments, and voices are already
heard suggesting that this matter be dealt with in the next round of
GATT negotiations. 278
However, it would seem that, on its own, the functionalist theory
is incapable of explaining the procedural juridicization process, which
has led to the creation of legal mechanisms for enforcing the agreed
rules. When a trade dispute arises and there is an open clash between
the interests of the States involved, there are often strong domestic
and external political interests involved, and the questions go beyond
pure "technical" issues. One must therefore consider why, in recent
years, States have suddenly agreed to make themselves subject to en-
forcement procedures which were, in earlier years, completely unac-
ceptable to them.
C. The Decline of American Hegemony
Numerous scholars have pointed out that many international re-
gimes in the world economy were established and maintained in the
period following World War II by virtue of the existence of the clear
hegemony of the United States in the world order. The hegemonic
power of the United States served as the central force behind the es-
276 JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L. PFALZGRAFF, CoNTIENDiNo TIEomms OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 432 (3rd ed. 1990).
277 See supra Part II, para. B:3.
278 In the Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO, held in December 1996, it was de-
cided to establish a working group "to examine the relationship between trade and investment."
Article 20 of The Ministerial Declaration <http://www.wto.org.>. 'his was a compromise be-
tween the developed countries' demand for negotiations in this field and the opposition of the
developing countries.
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tablishment of these regimes.279 Examples are provided by all the
Bretton Woods institutions, including GATT, which were integrated
into the Pax Americana of the 1940's. Nevertheless, as Professor Keo-
hane has shown, these regimes may continue to flourish on the basis
of more equal cooperation between the States, even after the decline
of American hegemony, by virtue of the joint interest of all parties in
their continued existence.28 0 Utilizing game theory and the Coase the-
orem,28 1 Keohane explains how these regimes reduce the transaction
cost involved in achieving agreements and cooperation between the
States and raise the costs of violating them.' This result is achieved
by the transformation of the parties into "repeat players" and inter-
twining different reciprocal interests which are subject to one regime.
Thus, a measure which harms a certain State is no longer a one-time
action per se without general significance but is, rather, a violation of
GATT with significant repercussions on a wide number of issues and
interests of the violating State. The temptation to "cheat" declines,
whereas the value of reputation rises. In this way, the regime succeeds
in anchoring the mutual expectations of the parties on stable founda-
tions and in reducing the uncertainties of international trade. Simi-
larly, it reduces the costs involved in achieving new Pareto-optimal
transactions between the States, since the forum and framework al-
ready exist and the rules of the game are known.
This line of thought leads to the following possible explanation.
During the period of American hegemony, which lasted until the end
of the 1960's, there was no need for a strong enforcement procedure
and an expansive regime. The power of American influence came in
lieu thereof, and it ensured that the contracting parties of GATr
would also honor their commitments for the benefit of the regimes
established by it. Indeed, when the United States itself was not inter-
279 Robert Gilpin has put it thus: "the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax
Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security. Great Britain and the
United States created and enforced the rules of a liberal international economic order." RoB-
ERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD PoLITrcs 145 (1981). See also CHARLES P. KIN-
DLEBERGER, THE WoRLD IN DEPRESSION: 1929-1939 305 (1973).
280 See generally ROBERT E. KoHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DIscoRD IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONONuc RELATIONS (1984).
281 This theorem was first formulated in Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L.
AND ECON. 1 (1960). The theorem states that a Pareto-optimal corrective transaction can only
be ensured under three conditions: a legal system which determines liability for actions and
which may be enforced by the State; full information; and zero transaction costs. Keohane con-
cludes from this that the creation of a regime which determines clear rules of liability and sup-
plies information at a low cost to all the parties, will inevitably assist in achieving efficient
solutions which are based on co-operation between the parties. KoHANE, supra note 280, at 87.
282 KEoHANr, supra note 280, at 85-109.
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ested in the promotion of the regime in a particular area, the regime
was not established in that area. Thus, for example, the establishment
of the International Trade Organization was torpedoed by the United
States Senate. Similarly, in the 1950's, agricultural regulation col-
lapsed completely as a result of being abandoned by the United
States.2 83 With the decline of the United States hegemony in the
1970's and the rise in power of new economic centers, such as the EC,
Japan, Canada and, recently, other Far East countries, including Tai-
wan, Korea and China, there was a greater need for a strong and au-
tonomous regime with effective and independent enforcement
mechanisms. It is interesting that in this period it was actually the
United States that utilized the GATT dispute settlement procedures
more than any other country.28 4 Accordingly, it was also the United
States which was the principal advocate of strengthening the GATT
enforcement mechanism, whereas the other parties ultimately pre-
ferred that mechanism to the unilateral retaliatory measures which the
United States could adopt under the notorious Section 301.285
On this basis, it is also possible to explain the phenomenon of the
expansion of the GATr regime to new areas, such as services and
intellectual property.28 6 Because of the decline of American hegem-
ony, there was a growing need to base the regime on a wider consen-
sus of mutual benefits. For this purpose, it is necessary to identify
suitable "exchange transactions" which will be beneficial to all those
involved, and, in particular, which will be able to bridge the adverse
interests of the developed States viz a vis the developing States. Ex-
panding the application of the agreement to a greater number of areas
will naturally increase the scope for identifying such transactions.
283 JOHN. H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATr 718 (1969).
284 Between the years 1948-1989, the United States filed 71 official complaints within the
GAT' framework, with only a small percentage of complaints being filed before the 1970s. The
European Community, which is next in line, filed only 30 complaints and even if the individual
complaints of the States comprising the EC are added to this figure, the total does not match the
number of complaints filed by the United States. (It is noteworthy that Japan filed only 4 com-
plaints during this entire period). HUDEC, supra note 4, at 395-404.
285 See CROOME, supra note 41, at 279. In contrast to this analysis, compare the contrary
assessment made in 1991 (which ultimately proved to be mistaken) to the effect that "GAIT
died" because of the impossibility of maintaining such a system with the hegemonic power of the
United States. Lester C. Thurow, GATT is Dead, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, Feb. 1991. This
article was written during the period of crisis in negotiations in late 1990, with the failure of the
Ministerial Committee in Brussels.
286 It should be pointed out that there are already initiatives on the part of the EC and the
United States to commence negotiations to expand GATT to such important new matters as
investments, workers' rights, and fair competition rules.
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Thus, for example, in the Uruguay Round, the developed countries28 7
finally agreed to reduce protective measures for the agriculture and
textile industries and open them to imports from the developing coun-
tries. This agreement could be reached only by virtue of the consent of
the developing countries to sign agreements in the fields of services
and intellectual property, where the developed countries see great po-
tential for trade. 88 There are also examples outside the North-South
equation. Contrary to the position taken by the United States, France
achieved protection for "geographical indications" within the frame-
work of the TRIPs agreement28 9 for the benefit of such well-known
products as champagne and cognac.290 The French, however, had to
agree to reduce subsidies on agriculture. The fact that the final agree-
ment was part of a "package deal" (or, according to GATT jargon, a
"single undertaking"), which comprised many and varied components,
was what finally enabled its successful completion.
D. The Declining Importance of the Security Factor
Another phenomenon which characterizes the period since World
War II, and which has occurred concurrently with the juridicization
process, is the gradual process of normalization in relations between
the non-communist States (such as the GATT contracting parties), the
strengthening of peaceful ties, and the declining fear of military attack
by one of these States against another. Over the years, the advanced
2S7 With regard to agriculture, this was true primarily for Japan and the European States,
which followed a highly protectionist policy in this area and opposed liberalization, whereas the
United States was one of the countries which urged the elimination of the protective measures
and subsidies.
288 See CROOME, supra note 41, at 254-55.
289 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 75, arts. 22-24. "Geographical indications" are terms or
other indications which identify the product with a specific geographical source-such as a cer-
tain State or region within the State having a reputation in respect of quality or special charac-
teristics. The agreement requires the GATT contracting states to supply internal legal measures
to a party interested in preventing the presentation of a product as a product manufactured or
produced in a geographical area other than its true place of origin. With regard to wines and
alcoholic beverages, such as "champagne" and "cognac" which are in fact names of places in
France possessing a reputation in the production of these prestigious beverages, these provisions
apply even where the word "like" or "imitation" is added to the term. Thus, it is prohibited to
sell Israeli sparkling wine, for example, under the name "champagne like wine," etc.
290 See Jim Chen, A Sober Look at Appellations of Origin: How the United States will Crash
France's Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29,55 (1996), which emphasizes that
the United States had no interest in acceding to the agreement related to the protection of
appellations of origins, and that its accession was solely the result of the agreement being part of
the GAIT package deal. Nevertheless, the author is not convinced that the TRIPs agreement
will give the French the protection they seek. See generally Louis Lorvellec, You've Got to Fight
for Your Right to Party: A Response to Professor Jim Chen, 5 MrNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 65 (1996)
(responding to Jim Chen's article).
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democracies have been transformed into prosperous States, less ori-
ented towards military might and more oriented towards economic
growth and social security.2 91
How does this development affect the nature of trade relations
between these countries? First, security concerns lead to the need to
ensure independence from external sources of supply. To guarantee
the survival of domestic suppliers with comparative disadvantage,
trade protection may be required. Countries with serious security
concerns may therefore be reluctant to take upon themselves interna-
tional obligations which may limit their freedom of action in this
regard.292
Another explanation is based on the distinction between abso-
lute and relative gains from trade. There is widespread agreement
that free trade is beneficial to the economies of all participating coun-
tries. Nevertheless, trade does not necessarily benefit all the States to
the same extent; it is certainly possible that State A might gain greater
benefit than State B. In a situation where there is concern for national
security, a State must not only ensure that its absolute gain is maxi-
mized, but also that its relative position compared to its neighbors is
maximized. Increasing economic disparity between two States might
create a strategic threat for the future.2 93 Accordingly, it is possible
that State B may prefer "managed" trade over free trade and a weak
trade regime which would allow the State to conduct managed trade.
On the other hand, when this consideration becomes less important,
States gain greater freedom to strengthen the cooperation amongst
themselves in order to ensure their mutual economic growth and im-
prove the standard of living of their citizens.294 To this end, a strong
and predictable regime is needed.
291 See Mrri TR , supra note 275, at 41-42, 95-96, 136-137, 144-145. See also Edward S.
Morse, The Transformation of Foreign Policies, 22 WORLD POtrrcs 371,383-85 (1970); ROBERT
0. KEoHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD Pou-rxcs IN
TRANsrnION 227 (1977).
292 Although all international trade agreements include exception provisons for such cases,
see, e.g., GATT, supra note 36, art. XXI, these provisions may not be broad enough for countries
with serious security concerns, and they may also be reluctant to subject themselves to the deci-
sion of international tribunals in this regard.
293 See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 Irr'L ORG. 485, 487 (1988).
294 Id. at 490. See also Ernst B. Haas, Technology, Pluralism, and the New Europe, in JOSEPH
S. NYE, JR., INTERNATIONAL REGIONAUISM 149, 158 (1968) (stating that "the argument is no
longer over the slice of the pie to go to each; it is increasingly over the means for increasing the
overall size of the pastry").
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This explanation offers greater clarification of the linkage be-
tween peace, trust and trade relations. In this light, one may also un-
derstand why, so long as the Soviet superpower and its satellites in
Eastern Europe were perceived to be a strategic threat to the United
States and Western European countries which controlled GATT,
there was no room on the geopolitical level for the accession of the
former States to the GATT framework.295 Instead, these States estab-
lished a competing trade organization known as the Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
29 6
E. The Influence of Ideological Changes
Recent decades have witnessed the increasing prominence of lib-
eral-economic ideas among intellectuals, politicians and constituen-
cies.297 Contemporaneously, socialist and communist regimes are
collapsing one after another, along with their underlying ideologies.
Appreciation of the benefits of a free economyopen to competition
from within and without is spreading along with the recognition of
the damage caused by protectionist trade policies. Consequently, it is
only reasonable to expect the strengthening of trade regimes based
on liberal economic ideas, both institutionally and substantively. It is
easier today than in the past to "sell" this type of regime to govern-
ments and members of parliament, as well as to members of the busi-
ness community.
295 Another reason was, of course, the fundamental difference between the communist eco-
nomic system which was built on a government monopoly over trade and the capitalist system
which is based on free market forces. The GATT agreement is based on the assumption that in
the absence of government trade barriers, private market forces will be able to act on the basis
of commercial considerations alone.
296 This organization was established by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czech-
oslovakia and Romania in 1949, contemporaneously with the establishment of GATI. In 1950,
Albania and East Germany joined; in 1962, Mongolia; in 1972, Cuba and in 1978, Vietnam.
Other socialist countries have observer status in the organization. See IvAN SZAsz, THm CMEA
UNIFORM LAV FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 33 n.68 (2nd. ed. 1985).
297 For documentation of the process, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 NAT'L
INTEREsr 3 (1989), and FRANcis FuKUYAmA, THm END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 42
(1992), where Fukuyama declares the ultimate victory of liberal ideology: "Privatization and
free trade have become the new watchwords in place of nationalization and import substitu-
tion... As mankind approaches the end of the millenium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and
social central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of po-
tentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular
sovereignty."
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F. The Increase of Economic Interdependence of States
Without derogating from the importance of the other factors, it
appears that the most important cause of the juridicization process in
international trade is the increasing economic interdependence of
States. This is one of the most prominent characteristics of world eco-
nomic developments in recent decades29 8 and, undoubtedly, has direct
-ramifications for the trade policy of all States.299 As a result of techno-
logical developments in recent decades, modes of transport and com-
munication between States have improved unrecognizably. The time
and cost needed for the transport of goods have been greatly reduced,
and channels of electronic communication enable the instantaneous
ordering of goods and transmission of payments. A sharp rise is tak-
ing place in the mobility of all economic resources, starting with mer-
chandise, services and capital and ending with technology and
manpower, which, in the absence of government intervention, could
flow freely between countries. Thus, for example, international trade
in merchandise has multiplied twelve-fold since the 1940's, many
times more than the world rise in gross national product.30 In many
countries, including Israel, more than fifty percent of GNP originates
from international trade.30' As a result, the economic state of the
country is ,highly dependent on what is done in foreign lands. On the
one hand, the interdependence of States has brought about great pros-
perity and a rise in the standard of living because merchandise is man-
ufactured in the most cost-effective States, utilizing their comparative
advantages, and increased competition improves choice and quality
and lowers prices. On the other hand, it has become more difficult for
national governments to control their own economies and implement
economic programs independently, since critical elements such as in-
terest rates and export and import performances are dependent on
numerous foreign factors which are outside the governments' con-
trol.302 For example, even an economic superpower such as the
298 Cf. MrrRANY, supra note 275, at 131-37; Haas, supra note 294, at 161-62; KEOHANE &
NYE, supra note 291, at 228.
299 See also JACKSON, supra note 3, at 3, who quotes Martin Feldstein, one-time senior advisor
to the American Administration, who wrote in 1985: "The experience of the past few years has
underlined the interdependence of the world economy. Sharp changes in international trade, in
capital flows and in exchange rates have affected all major economies. The rise in real interest
rates everywhere reflects the close link among capital markets."
300 The value of merchandise trade rose from about $57 billion in 1947 to $3,500 billion in
1991. GATr, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1983/84 (1984); GArr, INTERNAMONAL TRADE 1990/91
(1991).
301 The OECD Member Countries, 145 OECD OBSERVER 17, 22-23 (1987).
302 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also 1992 A.S.I.L. PRoC. 69 (Jackson's statements).
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United States appears to be dependent on the automobile marketing
policy applied in Japan, and changes in this sector have ramifications
for the rate of the dollar and unemployment levels in the United
States.303
In such a situation, supreme importance is attached to establish-
ing a strong and broadly based world trade regime which will ensure
coordination of policies and cooperation on the basis of stability and
certainty." 4 Stability and certainty are of critical importance in inter-
national trade as the trade system itself is anarchic. The trade system
is characterized by the absence of a central government where the
States are sovereign. In the absence of legal restriction, the States will
endeavour to promote their own immediate interests.3 0 5 On the other
hand, clear norms and strong enforcement procedures increase cer-
tainty and, by means of a system of sanctions in case of violations,
reduce to a minimum the steps which can be taken by foreign govern-
ments which are injurious to other States. Such a regime also helps to
overcome internal political market failures, which lead politicians to
prefer welfare-reducing short-term gains over long-term benefits and
stability.30 6 Politicians may rely on international obligations in order
to overcome internal pressures for trade protection, and, in that sense,
the WTO regime serves as an international constitutional restraint on
the abuse of foreign policy powers. 0 7
In conclusion, the more the world is transformed into a "small
global village," the greater is its need for "municipal by-laws" and "lo-
cal courts" which will regulate its affairs.
V. ANALOGUES TO THE EVOLUTION OF LAW IN HuMAN SOCIETY
A. The Origin of Law According to Hobbes
So far this article has dealt with the process of formation of a
substantive and procedural legal system which regulates the mutual
303 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
304 Historical testimony as to the influence of this consideration on the support of the EC for
the strengthening of the GATT regime, may be found in the statements of Christopher Bail, who
was the advisor to the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, in the beginning
of the 1990s, as well as the legal advisor to the EC Delegation to GATT" between 1985-1991, the
years during which the Uruguay Round agreement was being prepared. See A.S.I.L. PROC.,
supra note 302, at 74.
305 See WNI-A, supra note 29, at 23; see also HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A
STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD PoLrrcs (1977).
306 See TREBILcocK, supra note 26, and accompanying text.
307 See E.U. Petersmann, Why Do Governments Need the Uruguay Round Agreements,
NAFTA and the EEA?" 1994 AussEnvR scHrAFr 31.
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rights and obligations of sovereign States within the field of interna-
tional trade relations. Nevertheless, it is natural to seek analogues be-
tween this process and its possible causes and what we know about the
formation of legal systems in general and, in particular, systems which
regulate the mutual relations of individuals.
This comparison is particularly appropriate under the Hobbesian
theory of the origin of law, a theory whose starting point is the "natu-
ral" state of anarchy of "man eat man," which is remedied by means
of the "social charter. ' 308 Contrary to the "natural condition" in Hob-
bes' writings, which refers to no more than a hypothetical situation
which may or may not have existed in the distant past, in inter-State
trade relations, the anarchic condition is a very tangible reality, a fact
which was undoubtedly appreciated by the officials and statesmen
who brought about the GATr agreements. This state of affairs ex-
isted, inter alia, in the 1930's during the recession when the interna-
tional trade system collapsed completely, and the attempt to establish
even minimal cooperation within the framework of the Geneva Con-
vention on the Restrictions of Imports and Exports in 1927, the work
of that year's World Economic Committee, failed.309 This collapse led
to a drastic increase in protectionist measures on the part of all the
Western countries, including England. As a result, world trade be-
tween the years 1929-1939 was reduced by about sixty-six percent, and
the world sank into a deep economic recession.310 The danger of an-
other similar collapse has never actually passed, and of particular im-
portance was the serious crisis in negotiations during the Uruguay
Round in 1990311 when it appeared to many that the world trade sys-
tem was on the verge of disintegration. 312 Against this background,
the achievement of the "social charter," in the form of the WTO
308 THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN (1651). See also LLOYD, supra note 9, at 116-17. Inter alia,
Hobbes expressly refers there to the influence of the anarchy of the "natural condition" on the
economy and on international trade, because of the problem of uncertainty: "In such condition,
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture
of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea... and
which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short..." Id. at 156 (emphasis added). It is clear that the positivist
theory of Austin, to the effect that law is "the command of the sovereign", provides a less com-
fortable basis for comparison with public international trade law, which is entirely the fruit of
conventions and understandings between States and not of norms issued by a supreme legisla-
tor-who does not exist.
309 For a detailed description, see WiNLAm, supra note 29, at 26-27.
310 Id. at 30.
311 See CROOME, supra note 41, at 275-84.
312 See Thurow, supra note 285; see also BHAGWATI, supra note 160; cf. WnIAM, supra note
29, at 107-17.
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Agreement, prevented the outbreak of anarchy. The States could be
said to have created a new legal world trade regime which possessed
roots and characteristics similar to EVERY legal system in human soci-
ety according to the views of such great thinkers as Hobbes, Rousseau
and Grotius.
3 13
At first glance, the analogy to Hobbes' theory does not seem fully
applicable, as Hobbes uses the concept of the social charter to justify
totalitarian government.314 This is borne out of the unconditional
duty of the citizens to obey the ruler and place their security and well-
being in his hands, in contrast to the international arena of GATT
where there is no sovereign other than the States. Instead, particu-
larly in the post-hegomonic period, the actual model is one of cooper-
ation between sovereign States within the framework of an agreed
regime and subject to that regime and not to a supra-national body.
However, in the more ambitious regime of the EC, which too was
founded on the principles of trade liberalization and economic inte-
gration and which to a certain extent was a source of inspiration for
GATT,315 the Member States chose a type of Hobbesian model of
transferring sovereignty in certain areas to a supra-national governing
body, while undertaking to obey its authority.316 Indeed, there are
some who regard the WTO, together with its enforcement mecha-
nisms and decision-making procedures, as the harbinger of "supra-na-
tionalism,' '317 even though the difference between the WTO and the
EC (even in its original version before the Maastrict Treaty) are
enormous.
B. The Evolution of Law According to Anthropological Studies
Turning to anthropological studies in relation to the evolution of
law in primitive societies, one again finds interesting analogues to the
processes which have affected international trade law and the causes
313 See LLOYD, supra note 9, at 115-17; see also HAm H. COHEN, TmE LAW 35 (1992). Of the
same generation as Hobbes, Grotius was the greatest originator of international law, and he
constructed his pholosophy, inter alia, on the basis of the theory of the social charter.
314 In fact, later thinkers used Hobbes' assumptions in order to support a liberal and demo-
cratic government. See GEORGE W. PATON, A TExTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 107-08 (4th ed.
1972).
315 One example of this is the liberalization of trade in services. Another example is the
opening of government markets to international competition. See Reich, supra note 216.
316 See TREBILCOCK & HowsE, supra note 14, at 49.
317 Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach, GATr, NAFTA and the Subversion of the Democratic
Process, at 3 (unpublished article on file with author).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:775 (1996-97)
thereof, as discussed above.3 18 For example, researchers have found a
clear correlation between the level of economic development of a par-
ticular society and the level of development of its legal institutions.3 19
The researchers also point to the interaction and interdependence of
different elements of society, a factor which is referred to above in the
context of GATT320 as leading to the development and greater sophis-
tication of the legal system.321
Other researchers have pointed to this factor as the reason for the
repeal of the right to self-help and the replacement of that right by
independent judicial and enforcement systems. 322 As in the GATT
framework, the principle of reciprocal duties to which the members of
the community are subject and the expectation that this principle be
applied have been found to lie at the basis of every primitive legal
system.32 Prior to the creation of efficient judicial and enforcement
institutions, enforcement in such a legal system relies on the self-help
of the victim acting with the consent or encouragement of society.
The more the system develops and central government strengthens,
the more the right to self-help is restricted and becomes subject to
legal review on the part of the sovereign. Ultimately, it is eliminated
altogether.324 Serious violations, which injure the fabric of society, are
318 The comparison between law in primitive societies and public international law is not new.
Even Paton, in his book on jurisprudence, refers to the development of primitive law and consid-
ers it appropriate to draw an analogy between this and public international law "today." PATON,
supra note 314. This analogy also underlies Barkun's thesis. MICHAEL BtARuN, LAW WrmoTU
SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMnIvE SocIETms A1ND Trm WORLD CoMUrrES (1968). See also E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL, TnE LAW OF PRIMITvE MAN: A STuDY IN CoMPARAx=VE LEGAL DYNAM-
Ics 331-32 (1967). This point of view perceives the international arena as a community of sover-
eign States which live together and which require the regulation of the interaction between them
in the absence of a sovereign, in exactly the same way as individuals in a primitive, pre-auto-
cratic, society. The absence of legislative authorities and central enforcement, and the "primal"
nature of international law as a whole, provide the inspiration for this type of comparison.
319 A particularly thorough study collated immense quantities of information in respect of
more than 400 different tribes, and found that most of the societies in advanced stages of eco-
nomic development also possess developed legal systems. L.T. HOBHOUSE ET AL, THm MATE-
RIAL CULTURE AND SOCIAL INsTrrTrmONs OF THE SIMPLER PEOPLES (1915), cited in PATON,
supra note 314, at 47.
320 See infra Part IV.
321 See Lucy MAIr, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ANTRoPOLOoY 141 (2nd ed. 1972), rely-
ing on the study undertaken by Prof. Bronislaw Malinovski, infra note 323. See also HOEBEL,
supra note 318, at 316.
322 See MAiR, supra note 321, at 148.
323 BROMSLAW MALrNOVSm, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SoCIETY 67-68 (1932); and in
his introduction to HERBERT IAN HOGBIN, LAW AND ORDER IN POLYNESIA Xxxvi, xl(1972). See
also PATON, supra note 314, at 49.
324 HOGBIN, supra note 323, at 230.
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punished by excommunication and expulsion from the community.
325
Even after the establishment of courts for the settlement of disputes,
the enforcement measures applied by them are primitive. Under Ro-
man law, for example, the plaintiff himself was required to ensure the
appearance of the defendant.326
As has been seen above, international trade law too is largely
based on self-help on the part of the States, i.e., unilateral sanctions
against violations injurious to them. This formula is evident particu-
larly in "first-generation" free trade agreements, such as the agree-
ment between Israel and the EC of 1975.327 That agreement contains
no procedure at all for making an objective, independent determina-
tion in relation to a dispute arising between the parties, even where
the violation is clear. Instead, enforcement is completely dependent
on unilateral "defensive steps," i.e., self-help on the part of the State
which has been affected. 28 As we have seen,329 prior to the comple-
tion of the Uruguay Round, GATT allowed an objective dispute set-
tlement procedure to be conducted, but also required a significant
level of cooperation on the part of the defendant State in order to
allow the procedure to go ahead., Its consent was required to the
adoption of a panel decision, as well as to its enforcement. An effec-
tive, sophisticated and binding dispute settlement mechanism was in-
troduced only in the latest round of talks, but even there the
enforcement measures in the event of disobedience continue to be
based on self-help with the consent of the "community" (the States of
the organization). 3  If the law of international trade will evolve in
the manner of ancient law, the future will witness a gradual lessening
of the right to self-help and its replacement by sanctions on the part of
the "community," i.e., the organization. Such a process is already tak-
ing place today within the framework of the EC.
331
325 PATON, supra note 314, at 49-50.
326 See HERBERT FELIX JoLowicz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN
LAW 175 (1932). See also PATON, supra note 514, at 50-51.
327 1975 Agreement, supra note 173, at 1-3.
328 Id. arts. 16, 25, at 5-8.
329 See supra Part II.C.1.
330 See supra Part II.C.2.h.
331 From the beginning, the European Community has possessed supra-national prosecutory
and judicial authorities. The European Commission was granted authority by the Treaty of
Rome of 1957, supra note 178 (the Treaty which established the EEC) to supervise the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Treaty, including filing claims against States which do not
fulfill their obligations. Id. art. 169. The claims are filed in the European Court of Justice, which
too is a supra-national body. However, up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (the
European Union Convention), the Court did not have independent enforcement powers against
States, -and at the most could declare that a Member State had not fulfilled its obligations. Id.
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Another interesting analogy concerns the character of the sub-
stantive law. It appears that primitive systems of law (and this is also
true of English law in the 13th century) are characterized by flexible
and lenient rules. Only after long development have the rules become
stricter and the drafting more decisive and occasionally formalistic. 332
A process similar to this has been seen in the developmental stages of
GATT, as discussed above.
333
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from anthropo-
logical studies is that most of the laws of ancient societies reflect some
sort of logical-biological reality or functional and important social-
economic purpose.334 This is particularly true of laws which develop
over a period of many years and which, therefore, express and serve
the needs of the community. Accordingly, compliance with these laws
is obtained not only by threat of sanctions in the event of violation,
but also, and primarily, by virtue of the recognition among the mem-
bers of the community of the inherent benefits derived from obedi-
ence to laws and the legal system as a whole.335 This recognition was,
undoubtedly, also the decisive factor in the GATT world trade re-
gime, and it explains, more than the fear of sanctions, the fundamental
willingness of States to obey this regime, even where in the short term
this may entail a conflict with certain national interests.336 This is
borne out by the relatively small number of cases in which there has
been a need for sanctions in order to enforce clear norms of the
GATT regime. It should not be concluded from this that there is no
need for sanctions at all. It is important that sanctions be available
and be "put in writing" in case of need. But more important is the
ability to achieve a clear and objective determination.of the contents
and significance of international norms of conduct, on the assumption
art. 171. The Maastricht Treaty, amended Article 171, and conferred on the Court power to fine
a State which refuses to abide by the decision of the Court. See Treaty on European Union, 1992
O.J. (C224) 1, 61-62. See also LEv, supra note 184, at 48-49. The fines may be collected by
means of deductions from allocations payable to the State from the Community budget. Id.
332 See FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MArTLAND, THM HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIM OF EDWARD 127 (2nd ed. 1899). See also PATON, supra note 314, at 53-
54.
333 See supra Parts II.B.1-B.2.
334 MALr/movsKi, supra note 323.
335 The classical expression of this 1iosition is, of course, found in the words of Socrates in
prison, when his friend tried to persuade him to escape and thereby save his life. See Crito, in
THE COLLECrED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 27 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds. & Hugh
Tredenick trans., 1982).
336 See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 83. See also Louis IHNiN, How NA-nONs BEHAVE: LAW
AND FOREIGN POLICY 49-68 (2d ed. 1979) (analyzing why States generally obey international
law).
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that States generally respect the rule Pacta sunt servanda337 and are
interested in the proper functioning of the world trade regime.338
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have doumented the process of juridicization of
international trade relations within the framework of GATT and have
attempted to explain its causes. This process, particularly as reflected
in its most recent and sharply delineated form in the dispute settle-
ment procedure of the WTO agreement and "third generation" FTAs,
has finally refuted the classic "realist" theory concerning the nature
and limits of international trade agreements. This realist approach
viewed international trade agreements as essentially diplomatic ar-
rangements and assumed that they could never be more than that.339
Today, the GATT regime is purposefully constructed in such a way as
to offer clear rules of conduct regarding trade relations, as well as to
achieve decisive, speedy and objective legal determinations in the
event of trade disputes between States. In this way, international
trade law has apparently reached a level of development which is so
far unprecedented in most other fields of public international law,340
except in regional arrangements, such as the European Union.
From the above analysis, it is apparent that, in recent years, a
"world society," a society which is characterized by increasing cross-
sector interaction (i.e., between States, corporations and individuals)
and by the construction of a legal-organizational regime to regulate
this interaction, has begun to coalesce within the arena of interna-
tional economics. It is a society characterized by the increasing eco-
nomic interdependence of its members, which possesses a relatively
high level of ideological homogeneity, at least in so far as touches the
fundamental rules of its common economic regime. Liberal economic
perceptions, giving priority to achieving economic prosperity and so-
cial security as opposed to building military power and advancing ex-
pansionist aspirations, and reliance on peaceful relations together are
337 "Agreements must be observed"; this rule is also entrenched in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339. Similarly, the rule is
entrenched in the internal legal systems of all the GATT Member States, and this fact too
strengthens the sense of duty to fulfil the obligations which the State takes upon itself.
338 See HENKIN, supra note 336.
339 See supra note 1 and the accompanying text. See also Robert Hudec, The GATT Legal
System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WoRu TRADE L. 615, 665 (1970).
340 Daniel K. Tarullo states: "the international trade system looks more like a legal system
than do the areas of international law traditionally denominated public." Daniel K. Tarullo,
Logic, Myth and International Economic Order, 26 HARv. IVrr'L Li. 533, 533 (1985).
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what provided the appropriate platform for the creation of the legal
trade regime. The catalyst was the vital need for stability and cer-
tainty in world trade on the basis of clear and enforceable rules.
Leaders of the "global village," therefore, recognized their need for
law no less than the primitive villagers of ancient times.
The new regime has affected areas previously untouched in public
international law, although this interstate regime can still not com-
pare, of course, to domestic legal systems of normal countries. The
States still strive to preserve their sovereignty and, in the absence of
an autonomous enforcement mechanism (such as an execution office),
compliance is still ultimately dependent on the acquiescence of the
State itself. The legal regime of the WTO will therefore have to be
tested, first and foremost, on the ground and, over the course of time,
not only on paper. Much will depend on the ability of the WTO insti-
tutions to isolate the dispute settlement procedures from political in-
fluence and win the confidence of the international community as
independent and objective bodies. But this is still not enough. Leaders
of States too must show maturity and respect the rulings, even where
they are inconvenient politically. Failure to do so may lead to the col-
lapse of the world trade regime, as has already happened in the
past.34
1
The identification and mapping of the elements creating the new
regime may help us evaluate the future of the world trade regime and
the risk of its collapse. The factors considered above indicate that
there is no immediate danger of an impending breakdown. There is
no reason to suppose that the level of economic interdependence will
lessen, or that the process of globalization of the world economy will
halt in the near future. On the other hand, the sudden outbreak of a
military conflict or the creation of a new strategic-security threat
against one of the economic powers may easily affect the international
climate and the spectrum of considerations and preferences. Even an
ideological climate is something which may change. Already, voices
may be heard, both in the North and in the South, opposing the lib-
eral-capitalist concepts underlying GATT. It is claimed that GAT
allows the continued colonial exploitation of developing countries and
the promotion of swifter economic development at the price of serious
harm to the environment. If the heads of the WTO and State leaders
fail to heed these voices and find suitable solutions to the criticisms
raised within the framework of the regime, then one may expect
341 See PETERsMANN, supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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th*r.eats on the continued success of the new legal regime from this
direction as well.
Moreover, if the WTO is intended to fulfil the function of leading
the "global village" in the area of international economic relations,
then it would be appropriate for this leadership and for the rule-mak-
ing function which it fulfills to be carried out in accordance with the
democratic principles of leadership accepted in modern States. One
would then argue for the process of "legislation" to be carried out by
representatives elected in a democratic manner, by means of a system
which reflects all the interests involved and all those who may be af-
fected by the rules to be established. The current situation, in which
the debates on trade rules are conducted under cover of secrecy and
far removed from the scrutiny of the public, where non-governmental
organizations (voicing important interests not always properly repre-
sented in governmental mechanisms) have no right to participate, is
creating an estrangement between large sectors of the public and the
multilateral regime.34 2 This regime is likely to be perceived as the fruit
342 Recently, this issue has given rise to intense debate, both on the political and academic
level, particularly, in connection with the issue of environmental protection vis-d-vis free trade.
See eg., Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral
Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1279 (1992). The author criticizes the
secrecy surrounding the dispute settlement process of GATT, and calls for the establishment of a
neutral forum for the settlement of trade disputes with the right of participation and locus standi
given to representatives of both governments and non-governent organizations (NGOs). Id. at
1285-87, 1296-98. In her view, the GATT principle of "transparency" should be implemented
not only in relation to the trade policy of the Member States, but also in relation to GATT
proceedings themselves, so as to "practice what you preach." See also Steve Charnowitz, Partici-
pation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. IrNrr'L
EcoN. L. 331 (1996), who also advocates granting NGOs the right to participate in the construc-
tion of rules (the "legislation") and in dispute settlement proceedings (the "adjudication") of the
World Trade Organization; a right which had existed under the Havana Charter for the establish-
ment of the International Trade Organization. See also Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders
Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 359 (1996). This author argues that it is actually the "legalization" of the dispute
settlement process of the WTO which requires steps to be taken to ensure the public legitimacy
of the organization. Accordingly, in his view, all the interests and bodies operating in interna-
tional trade (and not only governments) should be allowed to participate in the decision-making
process. Nevertheless, there are also some who oppose this view, and believe that granting locus
standi to non-governmental bodies and excessive transparency in the proceedings of the organi-
zation can only harm the organization by bringing the international trade disputes to the center
of media attention. In their view, this is likely to encourage nationalist sentiments and increase
political sensitivity. Similarly, it is feared that only groups possessing sufficient means will be
able to exercise the right of locus standi, and they will make use of this right to promote their
private interests and not the interests of the collective. See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Stand-
ing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
295 (1996). This author proposes that instead of extending the right of standing, wider participa-
tion should be allowed in the dispute settlement panels, so as to include experts in fields other
than international trade, such as experts in environmental protection-in disputes relating to
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of the labors of unelected technocrats and capitalist interests, a sort of
supra-system which undermines the internal democratic system of the
State. This is also true of the adjudication process conducted within
the framework of the panels, which some argue are not sufficiently
open, do not give sufficient consideration to interests which are not
economic in nature and do not give a right of hearing to non-govern-
mental bodies, such as environmental organizations and labor organi-
zations.343 The greater the influence of international trade agreements
and the further the juridicization process advances, the more will the
"democratic deficiency" of these regimes be apparent, to the detri-
ment of their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. A similar process
occurred in the EC,3" and the continued existence and development
of the EC was only made possible by efforts to resolve these types of
problems.4 5
Within the framework of the WTO too it will be necessary to
solve the problem of the "democratic deficiency," and to find the right
balance between the promotion of economic prosperity, on the one
hand, and the interest in protecting the environment and other social
concerns, on the other. The first steps in this direction have already
been taken.346 If such a balance is achieved, it will be possible to ex-
this matter-or representatives of the International Labour Organization-in disputes relating
to trade restrictions on products manufactured by child labor. In his view, the authority to do so
exists under the new DSU. See supra note 84, art. 8(1).
343 Id. and accompanying texts.
344 See, eg., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2466-74
(1991). See also J.H.H. Weiler with U.R. Haltem & F.C. Mayer, European Democracy and its
Critics - Five Uneasy Pieces, HARvARD JEAN MoNrNT WORmNG PAPER No. 1/95.
345 Thus, for example, it was decided to strengthen the standing of the European Parliament,
which is the only body in the European system which is directly elected by all the citizens of the
Community. Indeed, it was only decided to proceed with direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment in the 1970s, and they were first conducted in 1979. Similarly, the Single European Act
1985 gave the European Parliament, for the first time, the opportunity to take part in the legisla-
tive process (which is primarily controlled by the Council of Ministers and the Commission) by
means of the "co-operation" procedure. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 widened this power by
establishing the "joint decision" procedure. See T.C. HAR=_Y, THm FoU1NArONS OF EURO-
PEAN CoMMuNrTY LAW 32-34 (1988); see generally Paul Marquardt, Deficit Reduction: Democ-
racy, Technocracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union, 4 DuKE J. Coup. & INr'L L. 265
(1994).
346 As a result of public criticism, the World Trade Organization has already introduced cer-
tain changes for the purpose of promoting transparency. Thus, for example, the Organization
now publishes studies prepared by the Secretariat earlier than it did before, and the Secretariat
staff conducts informal consultations with non-governmental organizations. See Benedict Kings-
bury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organization and the Liberal Project to
Reconceptualize International Law, 5 Y.B. INT'L E v. L. 1,14 (1994). Similarly, the new memo-
randum of understanding permits States to make public their positions in disputes conducted
within the framework of the Organization. It should also be noted that the World Trade Organi-
zation opened a site on the Internet in 1995, for the purpose of supplying routine and up-to-date
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pect not a retreat in the juridicization process but, rather, its contin-
ued development. The next stage in this process is likely to be the
continued integration of public international trade law into the do-
mestic legal systems of the States and the grant of private rights of
action by virtue of this to individuals. In practice, this process has al-
ready commenced a47 and, if it continues, has the potential to bring
down the "Chinese wall," established by the dualist theory,348 be-
tween public international law and domestic law. It appears, there-
fore, that international trade relations are likely to continue to serve
as the new and exciting target to be conquered by the "rule of law."
information, according to the Secretary-General of the WTO on the grounds that the WTO must
ensure that it is understood properly and that the public have access to it. The address of the site
is: http://www.wto.org It was also recently decided to publish panel and Appelate Body deci-
sions as soon as they are issued and to make them available to the general public.
347 See, for example, the obligation under the GATI Agreement on Government Procure-
ment, supra note 50, to enable direct legal attacks by potential suppliers against procurement
proceedings which are contrary to the agreement. See Reich, supra note 50, at 425. See also
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AT-, IMPLEMENTING THm TOKYO RoUND 207-09 (1984).
348 See DiNsTEN, supra note 7, at 128-30.
